Yamauchi Atsuo, Tanimoto Jun, Hagishima Aya
Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Kasuga-koen, Kasuga-shi, Fukuoka 816-8580, Japan.
Biosystems. 2010 Nov-Dec;102(2-3):82-7. doi: 10.1016/j.biosystems.2010.07.017. Epub 2010 Aug 7.
The evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma game in structured networks has been studied extensively to understand network reciprocity. However, in some cases results of these studies cannot be compared because not only the network structures but also the network parameters, rules for updating strategies, and update dynamics differ among them. In this study, we investigated the effect of experimental conditions by conducting a series of systematic factorial experiments. We found that those experimental assumptions are significantly important in network reciprocity, although we confirmed that network reciprocity can be basically explained by the average degree of the network (Nowak, 2006; Ohtsuki et al., 2006).
为了理解网络互惠性，人们对结构化网络中的进化囚徒困境博弈进行了广泛研究。然而，在某些情况下，这些研究结果无法进行比较，因为它们不仅网络结构不同，而且网络参数、策略更新规则和更新动态也存在差异。在本研究中，我们通过进行一系列系统的析因实验来探究实验条件的影响。我们发现，尽管我们证实网络互惠性基本上可以用网络的平均度来解释（诺瓦克，2006；大月等人，2006），但这些实验假设在网络互惠性中具有显著重要性。
