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适度的组内偏差可使相互依存群体间的合作最大化。

Moderate intra-group bias maximizes cooperation on interdependent populations.

作者信息

Tang Changbing, Wang Zhen, Li Xiang

机构信息

Adaptive Networks and Control Lab, Department of Electronic Engineering, Fudan University, Shanghai, PR China.

Department of Physics, Hong Kong Baptist University, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong ; Center for Nonlinear Studies and the Beijing-Hong Kong-Singapore Joint Center for Nonlinear and Complex systems (Hong Kong), Hong Kong Baptist University, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong.

出版信息

PLoS One. 2014 Feb 12;9(2):e88412. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0088412. eCollection 2014.

DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0088412
PMID:24533084
原文链接:https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC3922813/
Abstract

Evolutionary game theory on spatial structures has received increasing attention during the past decades. However, the majority of these achievements focuses on single and static population structures, which is not fully consistent with the fact that real structures are composed of many interactive groups. These groups are interdependent on each other and present dynamical features, in which individuals mimic the strategy of neighbors and switch their partnerships continually. It is however unclear how the dynamical and interdependent interactions among groups affect the evolution of collective behaviors. In this work, we employ the prisoner's dilemma game to investigate how the dynamics of structure influences cooperation on interdependent populations, where populations are represented by group structures. It is found that the more robust the links between cooperators (or the more fragile the links between cooperators and defectors), the more prevalent of cooperation. Furthermore, theoretical analysis shows that the intra-group bias can favor cooperation, which is only possible when individuals are likely to attach neighbors within the same group. Yet, interestingly, cooperation can be even inhibited for large intra-group bias, allowing the moderate intra-group bias maximizes the cooperation level.

摘要

在过去几十年里,空间结构上的进化博弈论受到了越来越多的关注。然而,这些成果大多集中在单一且静态的种群结构上,这与实际结构由许多相互作用的群体组成这一事实并不完全相符。这些群体相互依存,并呈现出动态特征,其中个体模仿邻居的策略并不断改变他们的伙伴关系。然而,尚不清楚群体之间动态且相互依存的相互作用如何影响集体行为的演变。在这项工作中,我们采用囚徒困境博弈来研究结构动态如何影响相互依存种群中的合作,其中种群由群体结构表示。研究发现,合作者之间的联系越稳固(或者合作者与背叛者之间的联系越脆弱),合作就越普遍。此外,理论分析表明,群体内偏向有利于合作,这只有在个体可能与同一群体内的邻居建立联系时才有可能。然而,有趣的是,对于较大的群体内偏向,合作甚至可能受到抑制,适度的群体内偏向能使合作水平最大化。

https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/23b9/3922813/56eede616da8/pone.0088412.g007.jpg
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https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/23b9/3922813/cdbeb301b90e/pone.0088412.g006.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/23b9/3922813/56eede616da8/pone.0088412.g007.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/23b9/3922813/39cfaceb0506/pone.0088412.g001.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/23b9/3922813/15ba7a6e9e15/pone.0088412.g002.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/23b9/3922813/0e489362d504/pone.0088412.g003.jpg
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https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/23b9/3922813/30e607446120/pone.0088412.g005.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/23b9/3922813/cdbeb301b90e/pone.0088412.g006.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/23b9/3922813/56eede616da8/pone.0088412.g007.jpg

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