PRESTO, Japan Science and Technology Agency, 4-1-8 Honcho, Kawaguchi, Saitama 332-0012, Japan.
Evolution. 2010 Dec;64(12):3344-53. doi: 10.1111/j.1558-5646.2010.01117.x. Epub 2010 Sep 29.
This article studies evolutionary game dynamics in Wright's infinite island model. I study a general n × n matrix game and derive a basic equation that describes the change in frequency of strategies. A close observation of this equation reveals that three distinct effects are at work: direct benefit to a focal individual, kin-selected indirect benefit to the focal individual via its relatives, and the cost caused by increased kin competition in the focal individual's natal deme. Crucial parameters are the coefficient of relatedness between two individuals and its analogue for three individuals. I provide a number of examples and show when the traditional inclusive fitness measure is recovered and when not. Results demonstrate how evolutionary game theory fits into the framework of kin selection.
本文研究了 Wright 无限岛屿模型中的进化博弈动态。我研究了一个一般的 n×n 矩阵博弈，并推导出一个描述策略频率变化的基本方程。仔细观察这个方程，可以发现有三种不同的效应在起作用：焦点个体的直接收益、焦点个体通过其亲属获得的亲缘选择间接收益，以及焦点个体在出生地群体中因亲属竞争增加而产生的成本。关键参数是两个个体之间的亲缘系数及其三个个体的类似物。我提供了一些例子，并展示了传统的适合度衡量标准何时被恢复以及何时不被恢复。结果表明进化博弈论如何适应亲缘选择的框架。
