Section for Philosophy and Ethics, Eindhoven University of Technology, P.O. Box 513, 5600 MB, Eindhoven, The Netherlands.
Sci Eng Ethics. 2011 Sep;17(3):411-24. doi: 10.1007/s11948-010-9241-3. Epub 2010 Oct 8.
In this paper we discuss the hypothesis that, 'moral agency is distributed over both humans and technological artefacts', recently proposed by Peter-Paul Verbeek. We present some arguments for thinking that Verbeek is mistaken. We argue that artefacts such as bridges, word processors, or bombs can never be (part of) moral agents. After having discussed some possible responses, as well as a moderate view proposed by Illies and Meijers, we conclude that technological artefacts are neutral tools that are at most bearers of instrumental value.
在本文中，我们讨论了彼得-保罗·维尔贝克（Peter-Paul Verbeek）最近提出的假设，即“道德主体既存在于人类中，也存在于技术人工制品中”。我们提出了一些论据，认为维尔贝克的观点是错误的。我们认为，桥梁、文字处理器或炸弹等人工制品永远不可能成为（部分）道德主体。在讨论了一些可能的回应以及伊利耶斯和迈耶斯（Illies and Meijers）提出的一种温和观点之后，我们得出结论，技术人工制品是中性工具，最多只是具有工具价值的载体。
