Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 79 JFK Street, Cambridge, MA 02138, and NBER
Am Econ Rev. 2010 Mar 1;100(1):193-213. doi: 10.1257/aer.100.1.193.
In the Medicare program, increases in cost sharing by a supplemental insurer can exert financial externalities. We study a policy change that raised patient cost sharing for the supplemental insurer for retired public employees in California. We find that physician visits and prescription drug usage have elasticities that are similar to those of the RAND Health Insurance Experiment (HIE). Unlike the HIE, however, we find substantial "offset" effects in terms of increased hospital utilization. The savings from increased cost sharing accrue mostly to the supplemental insurer, while the costs of increased hospitalization accrue mostly to Medicare.
在医疗保险计划中,附加保险公司的自付额增加会产生财务外部性。我们研究了加利福尼亚州为退休公务员的附加保险公司提高患者自付额的政策变化。我们发现,医生就诊次数和处方药使用量的弹性与兰德健康保险实验(HIE)相似。然而,与 HIE 不同的是,我们发现医院利用率的大幅“抵消”效应。增加自付额带来的节省主要归附加保险公司所有,而增加住院治疗的成本则主要由医疗保险承担。