Department of Population Medicine, Harvard Medical School, Harvard Pilgrim Health Care Institute, Boston, MA 02215, USA.
BMJ. 2011 Jan 25;342:d108. doi: 10.1136/bmj.d108.
To assess the impact of a pay for performance incentive on quality of care and outcomes among UK patients with hypertension in primary care.
Interrupted time series.
The Health Improvement Network (THIN) database, United Kingdom.
470 725 patients with hypertension diagnosed between January 2000 and August 2007.
The UK pay for performance incentive (the Quality and Outcomes Framework), which was implemented in April 2004 and included specific targets for general practitioners to show high quality care for patients with hypertension (and other diseases).
Centiles of systolic and diastolic blood pressures over time, rates of blood pressure monitoring, blood pressure control, and treatment intensity at monthly intervals for baseline (48 months) and 36 months after the implementation of pay for performance. Cumulative incidence of major hypertension related outcomes and all cause mortality for subgroups of newly treated (treatment started six months before pay for performance) and treatment experienced (started treatment in year before January 2001) patients to examine different stages of illness.
After accounting for secular trends, no changes in blood pressure monitoring (level change 0.85, 95% confidence interval -3.04 to 4.74, P=0.669 and trend change -0.01, -0.24 to 0.21, P=0.615), control (-1.19, -2.06 to 1.09, P=0.109 and -0.01, -0.06 to 0.03, P=0.569), or treatment intensity (0.67, -1.27 to 2.81, P=0.412 and 0.02, -0.23 to 0.19, P=0.706) were attributable to pay for performance. Pay for performance had no effect on the cumulative incidence of stroke, myocardial infarction, renal failure, heart failure, or all cause mortality in both treatment experienced and newly treated subgroups.
Good quality of care for hypertension was stable or improving before pay for performance was introduced. Pay for performance had no discernible effects on processes of care or on hypertension related clinical outcomes. Generous financial incentives, as designed in the UK pay for performance policy, may not be sufficient to improve quality of care and outcomes for hypertension and other common chronic conditions.
评估英国初级保健中基于绩效的激励措施对高血压患者护理质量和结局的影响。
中断时间序列。
英国健康改进网络(THIN)数据库。
470725 名 2000 年 1 月至 2007 年 8 月间确诊的高血压患者。
英国基于绩效的激励措施(质量和结果框架),该措施于 2004 年 4 月实施,其中包括全科医生为高血压患者(和其他疾病患者)提供高质量护理的具体目标。
随时间推移的收缩压和舒张压的百分位数、血压监测率、血压控制率和治疗强度,间隔为基线(48 个月)和实施基于绩效的激励措施后 36 个月。新治疗(治疗开始前 6 个月)和治疗经验(2001 年 1 月前开始治疗)患者亚组的主要高血压相关结局和全因死亡率的累积发生率,以检查不同阶段的疾病。
在考虑到季节性趋势后,血压监测(水平变化 0.85,95%置信区间 -3.04 至 4.74,P=0.669 和趋势变化 -0.01,-0.24 至 0.21,P=0.615)、控制(-1.19,-2.06 至 1.09,P=0.109 和 -0.01,-0.06 至 0.03,P=0.569)或治疗强度(0.67,-1.27 至 2.81,P=0.412 和 0.02,-0.23 至 0.19,P=0.706)均与基于绩效的激励措施无关。在新治疗和治疗经验患者亚组中,基于绩效的激励措施对中风、心肌梗死、肾衰竭、心力衰竭或全因死亡率的累积发生率均无影响。
在引入基于绩效的激励措施之前,高血压的护理质量已经稳定或正在改善。基于绩效的激励措施对护理过程或高血压相关临床结局均无明显影响。英国基于绩效的激励政策中设计的慷慨的经济激励措施可能不足以改善高血压和其他常见慢性病的护理质量和结局。