Resource Management in Asia-Pacific Program, The Crawford School of Economics and Government, Coombs Building, The Australian National University, Canberra, Australia.
Ann N Y Acad Sci. 2011 Feb;1219:153-70. doi: 10.1111/j.1749-6632.2010.05891.x.
This paper examines the problem of achieving global cooperation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Contributions to this problem are reviewed from noncooperative game theory, cooperative game theory, and implementation theory. We examine the solutions to games where players have a continuous choice about how much to pollute, as well as games where players make decisions about treaty participation. The implications of linking cooperation on climate change with cooperation on other issues, such as trade, are also examined. Cooperative and noncooperative approaches to coalition formation are investigated in order to examine the behavior of coalitions cooperating on climate change. One way to achieve cooperation is to design a game, known as a mechanism, whose equilibrium corresponds to an optimal outcome. This paper examines some mechanisms that are based on conditional commitments, and their policy implications. These mechanisms could make cooperation on climate change mitigation more likely.
本文探讨了实现全球合作以减少温室气体排放的问题。从非合作博弈论、合作博弈论和实施理论三个方面综述了对这一问题的贡献。我们考察了在玩家对污染程度有连续选择的情况下的博弈解决方案，以及在玩家就条约参与做出决策的情况下的博弈解决方案。还考察了将气候变化方面的合作与贸易等其他问题方面的合作联系起来的影响。研究了合作和非合作的联盟形成方法，以考察在气候变化方面合作的联盟的行为。实现合作的一种方法是设计一个博弈，称为机制，其均衡对应于最优结果。本文考察了一些基于有条件承诺的机制及其政策含义。这些机制可以使气候变化缓解方面的合作更有可能实现。
