International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, A-2361, Austria.
Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, Princeton University, Princeton, 08544 NJ, USA.
Sci Rep. 2020 Jun 19;10(1):10251. doi: 10.1038/s41598-020-63446-1.
Countries generally agree that global greenhouse gas emissions are too high, but prefer other countries reduce emissions rather than reducing their own. The Paris Agreement is intended to solve this collective action problem, but is likely insufficient. One proposed solution is a matching-commitment agreement, through which countries can change each other's incentives by committing to conditional emissions reductions, before countries decide on their unconditional reductions. Here, we study matching-commitment agreements between two heterogeneous countries. We find that such agreements (1) incentivize both countries to make matching commitments that in turn incentivize efficient emissions reductions, (2) reduce emissions from those expected without an agreement, and (3) increase both countries' welfare. Matching-commitment agreements are attractive because they do not require a central enforcing authority and only require countries to fulfil their promises; countries are left to choose their conditional and unconditional emissions reductions according to their own interests.
各国普遍认为全球温室气体排放过高，但希望其他国家减排而非自身减排。《巴黎协定》旨在解决这一共识行动问题，但可能还不够。一种拟议的解决方案是匹配承诺协议，通过该协议，各国可以在决定无条件减排之前，通过承诺有条件减排来改变彼此的激励措施。在这里，我们研究了两个异质国家之间的匹配承诺协议。我们发现，此类协议（1）激励两国做出匹配承诺，进而激励有效减排；（2）减少无协议情况下的排放量；（3）提高两国的福利。匹配承诺协议之所以具有吸引力，是因为它们不需要中央执法机构，只需要各国履行承诺；各国可以根据自身利益选择有条件和无条件减排。
