Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, P.O. Box 60 12 03, 14412 Potsdam, Germany.
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2011 Sep 20;108(38):15739-44. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1106265108. Epub 2011 Sep 8.
As the Copenhagen Accord indicates, most of the international community agrees that global mean temperature should not be allowed to rise more than two degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels to avoid unacceptable damages from climate change. The scientific evidence distilled in the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and recent reports by the US National Academies shows that this can only be achieved by vast reductions of greenhouse gas emissions. Still, international cooperation on greenhouse gas emissions reductions suffers from incentives to free-ride and to renegotiate agreements in case of noncompliance, and the same is true for other so-called "public good games." Using game theory, we show how one might overcome these problems with a simple dynamic strategy of linear compensation when the parameters of the problem fulfill some general conditions and players can be considered to be sufficiently rational. The proposed strategy redistributes liabilities according to past compliance levels in a proportionate and timely way. It can be used to implement any given allocation of target contributions, and we prove that it has several strong stability properties.
正如《哥本哈根协议》所指出的，大多数国际社会都认为，为了避免气候变化带来不可接受的损害，全球平均气温不应比工业化前水平升高超过 2 摄氏度。政府间气候变化专门委员会第四次评估报告和美国国家科学院最近的报告中总结的科学证据表明，只有大幅减少温室气体排放才能实现这一目标。然而，温室气体减排的国际合作仍然存在搭便车的动机，并且在不遵守协议的情况下重新谈判协议，其他所谓的“公益游戏”也是如此。我们使用博弈论表明，当问题的参数满足某些一般条件并且可以认为参与者具有足够的理性时，通过线性补偿的简单动态策略可以克服这些问题。所提出的策略根据过去的遵守水平按比例和及时地重新分配责任。它可以用于实施任何给定的目标贡献分配，我们证明它具有几个强大的稳定性属性。
