Social Systems Engineering Centre INSISOC, Valladolid, Spain.
PLoS One. 2011 Mar 9;6(3):e17661. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0017661.
The effect of spatial structure has been proved very relevant in repeated games. In this work we propose an agent based model where a fixed finite population of tagged agents play iteratively the Nash demand game in a regular lattice. The model extends the multiagent bargaining model by Axtell, Epstein and Young modifying the assumption of global interaction. Each agent is endowed with a memory and plays the best reply against the opponent's most frequent demand. We focus our analysis on the transient dynamics of the system, studying by computer simulation the set of states in which the system spends a considerable fraction of the time. The results show that all the possible persistent regimes in the global interaction model can also be observed in this spatial version. We also find that the mesoscopic properties of the interaction networks that the spatial distribution induces in the model have a significant impact on the diffusion of strategies, and can lead to new persistent regimes different from those found in previous research. In particular, community structure in the intratype interaction networks may cause that communities reach different persistent regimes as a consequence of the hindering diffusion effect of fluctuating agents at their borders.
空间结构的影响在重复博弈中被证明是非常相关的。在这项工作中，我们提出了一个基于代理的模型，其中一个固定的有限数量的标记代理在规则晶格上迭代地玩纳什需求博弈。该模型通过 Axtell、Epstein 和 Young 扩展了多代理讨价还价模型，修改了全局交互的假设。每个代理都有一个记忆，并对对手最频繁的需求做出最佳回应。我们专注于系统的瞬态动力学，通过计算机模拟研究系统花费大量时间的状态集。结果表明，在全局交互模型中所有可能的持久状态都可以在这个空间版本中观察到。我们还发现，模型中空间分布诱导的交互网络的介观性质对策略的扩散有重大影响，并可能导致与之前研究中发现的不同的新的持久状态。特别是，同种间交互网络中的社区结构可能导致由于边界处波动代理的扩散阻碍效应，社区达到不同的持久状态。
