Zuckerman S, Bovbjerg R R, Sloan F
Urban Institute, Washington, DC 20037.
Inquiry. 1990 Summer;27(2):167-82.
We use state-level data on physician malpractice premiums, claims, and awards, provided by insurance companies for the years 1974 to 1986, to evaluate the effectiveness of the various tort reforms that have been legislated during the 1970s and 1980s. In addition to the tort reforms, our analysis of premiums considers insurers' anticipated losses, returns on investments, the type of insurer, and premium regulation. Our results suggest that the only reforms that significantly lower premiums are those that either impose a cap on the amount of physician liability or reduce the amount of time a plaintiff has to initiate a claim. We also find that premiums are lower when states regulate rates by requiring prior approval of premiums. In addition, it appears that the observed cyclicality in premiums is due, in part, to fluctuations in the real interest rates available to insurers as returns on investments. Unfortunately, we did not find as strong a link between the determinants of premiums, claims, and awards as might be expected.
我们使用保险公司提供的1974年至1986年各州层面关于医生医疗事故保险费、索赔及赔偿的数据，来评估20世纪70年代和80年代立法实施的各种侵权法改革的有效性。除了侵权法改革，我们对保险费的分析还考虑了保险公司的预期损失、投资回报、保险公司类型以及保险费监管。我们的结果表明，唯一能显著降低保险费的改革是那些要么对医生责任金额设定上限，要么缩短原告提起索赔的时间的改革。我们还发现，当各州通过要求事先批准保险费来监管费率时，保险费会更低。此外，保险费中观察到的周期性似乎部分归因于保险公司可获得的作为投资回报的实际利率的波动。不幸的是，我们没有发现保险费、索赔及赔偿的决定因素之间存在如预期般紧密的联系。
