Einav Liran, Finkelstein Amy, Levin Jonathan
Department of Economics, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305, and NBER.
Annu Rev Econom. 2010;2:311-336. doi: 10.1146/annurev.economics.050708.143254.
We describe recent advances in the empirical analysis of insurance markets. This new research proposes ways to estimate individual demand for insurance and the relationship between prices and insurer costs in the presence of adverse and advantageous selection. We discuss how these models permit the measurement of welfare distortions arising from asymmetric information and the welfare consequences of potential government policy responses. We also discuss some challenges in modeling imperfect competition between insurers and outline a series of open research questions.
我们描述了保险市场实证分析的最新进展。这项新研究提出了在存在逆向选择和有利选择的情况下估计个人保险需求以及价格与保险公司成本之间关系的方法。我们讨论了这些模型如何能够衡量由信息不对称引起的福利扭曲以及潜在政府政策回应的福利后果。我们还讨论了对保险公司之间不完全竞争进行建模时面临的一些挑战，并概述了一系列有待研究的开放性问题。
