利用健康保险的非线性预算集模型评估风险保护与道德风险之间的权衡
Estimating the Tradeoff Between Risk Protection and Moral Hazard with a Nonlinear Budget Set Model of Health Insurance.
作者信息
Kowalski Amanda E
机构信息
Department of Economics, Yale University and NBER.
出版信息
Int J Ind Organ. 2015 Nov 1;43:122-135. doi: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.08.001.
Abstract
Insurance induces a tradeoff between the welfare gains from risk protection and the welfare losses from moral hazard. Empirical work traditionally estimates each side of the tradeoff separately, potentially yielding mutually inconsistent results. I develop a nonlinear budget set model of health insurance that allows for both simultaneously. Nonlinearities in the budget set arise from deductibles, coinsurance rates, and stoplosses that alter moral hazard as well as risk protection. I illustrate the properties of my model by estimating it using data on employer sponsored health insurance from a large firm.
摘要
保险会在风险保护带来的福利收益与道德风险造成的福利损失之间引发一种权衡。传统的实证研究分别估计权衡的每一方面，这可能会产生相互矛盾的结果。我构建了一个医疗保险的非线性预算集模型，该模型能够同时兼顾这两个方面。预算集中的非线性源于免赔额、共保率和止损条款，这些因素既会改变道德风险，也会影响风险保护。我通过使用一家大公司雇主提供的医疗保险数据对模型进行估计，来说明该模型的特性。
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