Baines Paul
Wellcome Trust Biomedical Ethics Research Fellow, Centre for Professional Ethics , Room CBC 2.001, Chancellor's Building, Keele University, Staffordshire ST5 5BG , UK.
Clin Ethics. 2010 Dec;5(4):195-200. doi: 10.1258/ce.2010.010033.
In an earlier paper I argued that we do not have an objective conception of best interests and that this is a particular problem because the courts describe that they use an '…objective approach or test. That test is the best interests of the patient' when choosing for children. I further argued that there was no obvious way in which we could hope to develop an objective notion of best interests. As well as this, I argued that a best-interest-based approach was a particular problem around the time of death of some children. A response from a legal perspective argued that, while there is not a clear conception of objective best interests, the courts have a well-described approach to finding a child's objective best interests. In this paper, I argue that without clear agreement on an objective conception of best interests, the courts are unable to locate an objective sense of best interests and that the solutions do not solve the problems that were identified in the initial paper 'Death and best interests'.
在一篇较早的论文中，我认为我们没有关于最佳利益的客观概念，而这是一个特殊问题，因为法院称在为儿童做选择时，他们采用的是“……客观方法或标准。该标准就是患者的最佳利益”。我进一步指出，我们没有明显的途径来希望形成一个关于最佳利益的客观概念。除此之外，我还认为基于最佳利益的方法在一些儿童死亡时会产生特殊问题。从法律角度作出的回应称，虽然没有明确的客观最佳利益概念，但法院有一套详尽描述的确定儿童客观最佳利益的方法。在本文中，我认为如果没有就最佳利益的客观概念达成明确共识，法院就无法找到最佳利益的客观意义，而且这些解决方案并未解决最初那篇《死亡与最佳利益》中所指出的问题。
