Suppr超能文献

在一个贪婪、流动的个体组成的模型社会中出现社会凝聚力。

Emergence of social cohesion in a model society of greedy, mobile individuals.

机构信息

ETH Zurich, CH-8092 Zurich, Switzerland.

出版信息

Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2011 Jul 12;108(28):11370-4. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1101044108. Epub 2011 Jun 27.

Abstract

Human wellbeing in modern societies relies on social cohesion, which can be characterized by high levels of cooperation and a large number of social ties. Both features, however, are frequently challenged by individual self-interest. In fact, the stability of social and economic systems can suddenly break down as the recent financial crisis and outbreaks of civil wars illustrate. To understand the conditions for the emergence and robustness of social cohesion, we simulate the creation of public goods among mobile agents, assuming that behavioral changes are determined by individual satisfaction. Specifically, we study a generalized win-stay-lose-shift learning model, which is only based on previous experience and rules out greenbeard effects that would allow individuals to guess future gains. The most noteworthy aspect of this model is that it promotes cooperation in social dilemma situations despite very low information requirements and without assuming imitation, a shadow of the future, reputation effects, signaling, or punishment. We find that moderate greediness favors social cohesion by a coevolution between cooperation and spatial organization, additionally showing that those cooperation-enforcing levels of greediness can be evolutionarily selected. However, a maladaptive trend of increasing greediness, although enhancing individuals' returns in the beginning, eventually causes cooperation and social relationships to fall apart. Our model is, therefore, expected to shed light on the long-standing problem of the emergence and stability of cooperative behavior.

摘要

现代人的幸福感依赖于社会凝聚力,而社会凝聚力的特点是高水平的合作和大量的社会关系。然而,这两个特点经常受到个人自身利益的挑战。事实上,正如最近的金融危机和内战爆发所表明的那样,社会和经济系统的稳定性可能会突然崩溃。为了理解社会凝聚力出现和稳健的条件,我们模拟了移动代理之间公共产品的创造,假设行为变化由个人满意度决定。具体来说,我们研究了一种广义的赢留输移学习模型,该模型仅基于以往的经验,排除了允许个体猜测未来收益的绿胡子效应。该模型最显著的特点是,尽管信息要求很低,并且不假设模仿、未来的影子、声誉效应、信号或惩罚,它也能促进社会困境中的合作。我们发现,适度的贪婪通过合作与空间组织之间的共同进化有利于社会凝聚力,此外还表明,那些促进合作的贪婪水平可以被进化选择。然而,贪婪的过度增长趋势虽然在开始时会增加个体的回报,但最终会导致合作和社会关系的破裂。因此,我们的模型有望阐明合作行为出现和稳定的长期问题。

相似文献

1
Emergence of social cohesion in a model society of greedy, mobile individuals.
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2011 Jul 12;108(28):11370-4. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1101044108. Epub 2011 Jun 27.
2
Social diversity promotes the emergence of cooperation in public goods games.
Nature. 2008 Jul 10;454(7201):213-6. doi: 10.1038/nature06940.
3
Does insurance against punishment undermine cooperation in the evolution of public goods games?
J Theor Biol. 2013 Mar 21;321:78-82. doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.12.019. Epub 2013 Jan 2.
4
Enhancing social cohesion with cooperative bots in societies of greedy, mobile individuals.
PNAS Nexus. 2024 Jun 5;3(6):pgae223. doi: 10.1093/pnasnexus/pgae223. eCollection 2024 Jun.
5
Sustainable cooperation based on reputation and habituation in the public goods game.
Biosystems. 2017 Oct;160:33-38. doi: 10.1016/j.biosystems.2017.08.003. Epub 2017 Aug 18.
6
Incipient cognition solves the spatial reciprocity conundrum of cooperation.
PLoS One. 2011 Mar 15;6(3):e17939. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0017939.
7
Win-stay-lose-learn promotes cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game with voluntary participation.
PLoS One. 2017 Feb 9;12(2):e0171680. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0171680. eCollection 2017.
8
Social penalty promotes cooperation in a cooperative society.
Sci Rep. 2015 Aug 4;5:12797. doi: 10.1038/srep12797.
9
Stable polymorphism of cooperators and punishers in a public goods game.
J Theor Biol. 2017 Apr 21;419:243-253. doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2016.11.012. Epub 2016 Nov 21.
10
Increasing returns to scale: The solution to the second-order social dilemma.
Sci Rep. 2016 Aug 18;6:31927. doi: 10.1038/srep31927.

引用本文的文献

1
Evolutionary dynamics of behavioral motivations for cooperation.
Nat Commun. 2025 Apr 29;16(1):4023. doi: 10.1038/s41467-025-59366-1.
2
Repeated games with partner choice.
PLoS Comput Biol. 2025 Feb 4;21(2):e1012810. doi: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1012810. eCollection 2025 Feb.
3
Enhancing social cohesion with cooperative bots in societies of greedy, mobile individuals.
PNAS Nexus. 2024 Jun 5;3(6):pgae223. doi: 10.1093/pnasnexus/pgae223. eCollection 2024 Jun.
4
The impact of mobility costs on cooperation and welfare in spatial social dilemmas.
Sci Rep. 2024 May 8;14(1):10572. doi: 10.1038/s41598-024-60806-z.
6
Development and Validation of the Win-Win Scale.
Front Psychol. 2021 May 21;12:657015. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2021.657015. eCollection 2021.
7
How strategy environment and wealth shape altruistic behaviour: cooperation rules affecting wealth distribution in dynamic networks.
Proc Biol Sci. 2020 Dec 23;287(1941):20202250. doi: 10.1098/rspb.2020.2250. Epub 2020 Dec 16.
8
Emergent social cohesion for coping with community disruptions in disasters.
J R Soc Interface. 2020 Mar;17(164):20190778. doi: 10.1098/rsif.2019.0778. Epub 2020 Mar 4.
9
Evolution of egalitarian social norm by resource management.
PLoS One. 2020 Jan 30;15(1):e0227902. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0227902. eCollection 2020.
10
Mobility can promote the evolution of cooperation via emergent self-assortment dynamics.
PLoS Comput Biol. 2017 Sep 8;13(9):e1005732. doi: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1005732. eCollection 2017 Sep.

本文引用的文献

1
Social experiments in the mesoscale: humans playing a spatial prisoner's dilemma.
PLoS One. 2010 Nov 12;5(11):e13749. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0013749.
2
Evolutionary game theory: Temporal and spatial effects beyond replicator dynamics.
Phys Life Rev. 2009 Dec;6(4):208-49. doi: 10.1016/j.plrev.2009.08.001. Epub 2009 Aug 7.
3
Human strategy updating in evolutionary games.
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2010 Feb 16;107(7):2962-6. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0912515107. Epub 2010 Feb 8.
4
The outbreak of cooperation among success-driven individuals under noisy conditions.
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2009 Mar 10;106(10):3680-5. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0811503106. Epub 2009 Feb 23.
5
Via freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishment.
Science. 2007 Jun 29;316(5833):1905-7. doi: 10.1126/science.1141588.
6
Time scales in evolutionary dynamics.
Phys Rev Lett. 2006 Oct 13;97(15):158701. doi: 10.1103/PhysRevLett.97.158701. Epub 2006 Oct 12.
7
Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations.
Bull Math Biol. 2004 Nov;66(6):1621-44. doi: 10.1016/j.bulm.2004.03.004.
8
The nature of human altruism.
Nature. 2003 Oct 23;425(6960):785-91. doi: 10.1038/nature02043.
9
The hitchhiker's guide to altruism: gene-culture coevolution, and the internalization of norms.
J Theor Biol. 2003 Feb 21;220(4):407-18. doi: 10.1006/jtbi.2003.3104.
10
Learning dynamics in social dilemmas.
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2002 May 14;99 Suppl 3(Suppl 3):7229-36. doi: 10.1073/pnas.092080099.

文献AI研究员

20分钟写一篇综述,助力文献阅读效率提升50倍。

立即体验

用中文搜PubMed

大模型驱动的PubMed中文搜索引擎

马上搜索

文档翻译

学术文献翻译模型,支持多种主流文档格式。

立即体验