Department of Philosophy, Université Lille-Nord de France UMR 8163, Lille, France.
Front Psychol. 2011 Sep 27;2:224. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00224. eCollection 2011.
Motivationally unconscious (M-unconscious) states are unconscious states that can directly motivate a subject's behavior and whose unconscious character typically results from a form of repression. The basic argument for M-unconscious states claims that they provide the best explanation for some seemingly non-rational behaviors, like akrasia, impulsivity, or apparent self-deception. This basic argument has been challenged on theoretical, empirical, and conceptual grounds. Drawing on recent works on apparent self-deception and on the "cognitive unconscious" I assess those objections. I argue that (i) even if there is a good theoretical argument for its existence, (ii) most empirical vindications of the M-unconscious miss their target. (iii) As for the conceptual objections, they compel us to modify the classical picture of the M-unconscious. I conclude that M-unconscious states and processes must be affective states and processes that the subject really feels and experiences - and which are in this sense conscious - even though they are not, or not well, cognitively accessible to him. Dual-process psychology and the literature on cold-hot empathy gaps partly support the existence of such M-unconscious states.
动力无意识（M-unconscious）状态是指能够直接激发主体行为的无意识状态，其无意识特征通常源于某种压抑形式。M-unconscious 状态的基本论点声称，它们为某些看似非理性的行为提供了最佳解释，例如意志薄弱、冲动或明显的自欺欺人。该基本论点在理论、经验和概念方面都受到了挑战。本文借鉴了最近关于明显自欺欺人和“认知无意识”的研究，评估了这些反对意见。我认为：（i）即使存在支持其存在的合理理论论点，（ii）大多数对 M-unconscious 的实证辩护都没有击中目标。（iii）至于概念上的反对意见，它们迫使我们修改 M-unconscious 的经典图景。我得出结论，M-unconscious 状态和过程必须是主体真正感受到和体验到的情感状态和过程——从这个意义上说，它们是有意识的——即使它们对主体来说无法或无法很好地进行认知。双过程心理学和关于冷热点共情差距的文献部分支持了这种 M-unconscious 状态的存在。
