Suppr超能文献

幼儿对事实信念与价值信念的理解。

Young children's understanding of fact beliefs versus value beliefs.

作者信息

Flavell J H, Flavell E R, Green F L, Moses L J

机构信息

Department of Psychology, Stanford University, CA 94305-2099.

出版信息

Child Dev. 1990 Aug;61(4):915-28.

PMID:2209196
Abstract

Recent research on the development of children's knowledge about the mind has shown that young 3-year-olds have difficulty inferring that another person holds a false belief about a matter of verifiable fact, even when provided with considerable help. 4 studies tested the hypothesis that they would have less difficulty inferring that another person holds an odd, nonnormative belief about a matter of taste or value--one which, like the false fact belief, they themselves do not hold. On fact-belief tasks, an experimenter acted as if, or even explicitly stated that, she believed that the contents of a container were other than what the children knew to be the case. On value-belief tasks, she behaved as if she believed that a stimulus had a good or bad taste, smell, or appearance, whereas they thought it had the opposite. The results of all 4 studies confirmed the hypothesis.

摘要

最近关于儿童心理知识发展的研究表明,即使得到了大量帮助,3岁左右的幼儿在推断他人对可证实事实持有错误信念时仍存在困难。有4项研究对以下假设进行了测试:在推断他人对口味或价值观问题持有奇怪的、非规范性信念时,他们遇到的困难会更少——这种信念与错误事实信念一样,是他们自己并不持有的。在事实信念任务中,一名实验者表现得好像,甚至明确表示,她认为容器中的物品与孩子们所知道的实际情况不同。在价值信念任务中,她表现得好像认为某种刺激物具有好或坏的味道、气味或外观,而孩子们却认为恰恰相反。所有4项研究的结果都证实了这一假设。

文献AI研究员

20分钟写一篇综述,助力文献阅读效率提升50倍。

立即体验

用中文搜PubMed

大模型驱动的PubMed中文搜索引擎

马上搜索

文档翻译

学术文献翻译模型,支持多种主流文档格式。

立即体验