Flavell J H, Flavell E R, Green F L, Moses L J
Department of Psychology, Stanford University, CA 94305-2099.
Child Dev. 1990 Aug;61(4):915-28.
Recent research on the development of children's knowledge about the mind has shown that young 3-year-olds have difficulty inferring that another person holds a false belief about a matter of verifiable fact, even when provided with considerable help. 4 studies tested the hypothesis that they would have less difficulty inferring that another person holds an odd, nonnormative belief about a matter of taste or value--one which, like the false fact belief, they themselves do not hold. On fact-belief tasks, an experimenter acted as if, or even explicitly stated that, she believed that the contents of a container were other than what the children knew to be the case. On value-belief tasks, she behaved as if she believed that a stimulus had a good or bad taste, smell, or appearance, whereas they thought it had the opposite. The results of all 4 studies confirmed the hypothesis.
最近关于儿童心理知识发展的研究表明，即使得到了大量帮助，3岁左右的幼儿在推断他人对可证实事实持有错误信念时仍存在困难。有4项研究对以下假设进行了测试：在推断他人对口味或价值观问题持有奇怪的、非规范性信念时，他们遇到的困难会更少——这种信念与错误事实信念一样，是他们自己并不持有的。在事实信念任务中，一名实验者表现得好像，甚至明确表示，她认为容器中的物品与孩子们所知道的实际情况不同。在价值信念任务中，她表现得好像认为某种刺激物具有好或坏的味道、气味或外观，而孩子们却认为恰恰相反。所有4项研究的结果都证实了这一假设。
