Taylor M, Flavell J H
Child Dev. 1984 Oct;55(5):1710-20.
When young children are asked questions about objects with misleading appearances, they make two kinds of errors: (1) phenomenism--they report appearance when asked to report reality; and (2) intellectual realism--they report reality when asked to report appearance. Two studies with 3-year-old children tested the hypothesis that phenomenism errors predominate when children are asked about objects' real and apparent properties, whereas intellectual realism errors predominate when children are asked about objects' real and apparent identities. The results of these studies provided some support for the property-identity hypothesis; children's appearance-reality judgments about properties tended to differ from those about identities. More phenomenism errors were elicited when the stimuli were described to the children in terms of their properties than when the very same stimulus objects were described in terms of their identities. Identity tasks were not found to elicit predominantly intellectual realism errors, although the data showed trends in this direction. The implications of these results for theories about young children's tendency to accept things in terms of their perceptual characteristics were briefly discussed.
当幼儿被问及有关具有误导性外观的物体的问题时，他们会犯两种错误：（1）现象主义——当被要求报告现实情况时，他们报告的是外观；（2）理智现实主义——当被要求报告外观时，他们报告的是现实情况。两项针对3岁儿童的研究检验了这样一个假设：当询问儿童物体的真实属性和表观属性时，现象主义错误占主导；而当询问儿童物体的真实身份和表观身份时，理智现实主义错误占主导。这些研究结果为属性-身份假设提供了一些支持；儿童对属性的外观-现实判断往往与对身份的判断不同。当根据属性向儿童描述刺激物时，比根据相同刺激物的身份进行描述时，引发的现象主义错误更多。虽然数据显示出朝这个方向的趋势，但身份任务并未被发现主要引发理智现实主义错误。本文简要讨论了这些结果对有关幼儿倾向于根据其感知特征接受事物的理论的影响。
