Koyama Atsushi, Fuse Akira, Hagiwara Jun, Matsumoto Gaku, Shiraishi Shinichiro, Masuno Tomohiko, Miyauchi Masato, Kawai Makoto, Yokota Hiroyuki
Department of Emergency and Critical Care Medicine, Nippon Medical School, Tokyo, Japan.
J Nippon Med Sch. 2011;78(6):393-6. doi: 10.1272/jnms.78.393.
On March 11, 2011, after the Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami, the government declared a nuclear emergency following damage to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. A second hydrogen explosion occurred on March 14 at the plant's No. 3 reactor and injured 11 people. At that time the prime minister urged people living 20 to 30 km from the Daiichi plant to stay indoors. Under these circumstances, many residents of Iwaki City, which was largely outside the 30-km zone, left the city, making it difficult to get supplies to the remaining residents. The only transportation route open for supplies and medical resources was roads, and many drivers feared the rumor that the city was contaminated by radioactive materials and, so, refused to go there. Nippon Medical School (NMS) heard that medical resources were running short at Iwaki Kyoritsu Hospital, which requested water, medications, food, fuel (gasoline), medical support, and the evacuation of 300 inpatients. As a first step, NMS decided to evaluate the situation at the hospital and, on March 16, the director of the NMS Advanced Emergency Center visited the hospital and helped provide triage for about 200 patients. Critically ill patients receiving ventilatory support were given priority for evacuation because they would be most at risk of not being able to evacuate should the Japanese government order an immediate evacuation of the city. We tried to evacuate the inpatients via an official framework, such as the Disaster Medical Assistance Team (DMAT), but DMAT could not support this mission because this hospital was not within the 30-km evacuation zone. Moreover, the Iwaki City government could not support the evacuation efforts because they were fearful of the rumor that Iwaki was contaminated by radioactive material. Ultimately, we realized that we had to conduct the mission ourselves and, so, contacted our colleagues in the Tokyo metropolitan area to prepare enough hospital beds. We evacuated 15 patients to 8 hospitals over a 5-day period. As a result, we could reduce the number of patients at Iwaki Kyoritsu Hospital, and, thereby, the collapse of medical services in the city was avoided. In retrospect, someone might say the government--either central or local--should ideally have carried out this mission and created a system by which to do it. At the same time, however, to overcome any future bureaucratic issues, we should also prepare private networks, such as those used by NMS, because they can respond flexibly to unexpected large-scale disasters.
2011年3月11日,东日本大地震及海啸发生后,福岛第一核电站受损,政府宣布进入核紧急状态。3月14日,该核电站3号反应堆发生第二次氢气爆炸,造成11人受伤。当时,首相敦促居住在距第一核电站20至30公里范围内的民众待在室内。在这种情况下,磐城市的许多居民大多居住在30公里区域之外,他们纷纷离开该市,这使得向留在市内的居民运送物资变得困难。唯一可供物资和医疗资源通行的运输路线是公路,但许多司机担心该市受到放射性物质污染的传言,因此拒绝前往。日本医科大学(NMS)听说磐城共济医院的医疗资源短缺,该医院请求提供水、药品、食品、燃料(汽油)、医疗支持,并疏散300名住院患者。作为第一步,NMS决定评估该医院的情况,并于3月16日,NMS高级急救中心主任前往该医院,协助对约200名患者进行分类。接受通气支持的重症患者被优先疏散,因为如果日本政府下令立即疏散该市,他们最有可能无法撤离。我们试图通过官方框架,如灾害医疗援助队(DMAT)疏散住院患者,但DMAT无法支持这项任务,因为这家医院不在30公里疏散区内。此外,磐城市政府也无法支持疏散工作,因为他们担心磐城受到放射性物质污染的传言。最终,我们意识到必须自行执行这项任务,于是联系了东京都地区的同事,准备足够的病床。我们在5天内将15名患者疏散到了8家医院。结果,我们减少了磐城共济医院的患者数量,从而避免了该市医疗服务的崩溃。回想起来,有人可能会说,理想情况下,中央或地方政府应该执行这项任务并建立一个执行机制。然而,与此同时,为了克服未来的官僚主义问题,我们也应该建立像NMS这样的私人网络,因为它们能够灵活应对意想不到的大规模灾难。