Department of Political Science, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305, USA.
Behav Brain Sci. 2012 Feb;35(1):31-2. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X11000926.
Costly punishment's scarcity "in the wild" does not belie strong reciprocity theory as Guala claims. In the presence of strong reciprocators, strategic defectors will cooperate and sanctioning will not occur. Accordingly, natural field experiments are necessary to assess a "wide" reading of costly punishment experiments. One such field experiment exists, and it supports the hypothesis that costly punishment promotes cooperation.
昂贵惩罚在“野外”的稀缺并不像瓜拉所声称的那样否定了强烈的互惠理论。在存在强烈互惠者的情况下,策略性的背叛者将进行合作,而不会出现制裁。因此,有必要进行自然现场实验来评估对昂贵惩罚实验的“广泛”解读。已经存在这样一个现场实验,它支持了昂贵惩罚促进合作的假设。