• 文献检索
  • 文档翻译
  • 深度研究
  • 学术资讯
  • Suppr Zotero 插件Zotero 插件
  • 邀请有礼
  • 套餐&价格
  • 历史记录
应用&插件
Suppr Zotero 插件Zotero 插件浏览器插件Mac 客户端Windows 客户端微信小程序
定价
高级版会员购买积分包购买API积分包
服务
文献检索文档翻译深度研究API 文档MCP 服务
关于我们
关于 Suppr公司介绍联系我们用户协议隐私条款
关注我们

Suppr 超能文献

核心技术专利:CN118964589B侵权必究
粤ICP备2023148730 号-1Suppr @ 2026

文献检索

告别复杂PubMed语法,用中文像聊天一样搜索,搜遍4000万医学文献。AI智能推荐,让科研检索更轻松。

立即免费搜索

文件翻译

保留排版,准确专业,支持PDF/Word/PPT等文件格式,支持 12+语言互译。

免费翻译文档

深度研究

AI帮你快速写综述,25分钟生成高质量综述,智能提取关键信息,辅助科研写作。

立即免费体验

强互惠是真实存在的,但没有证据表明不协调的高代价惩罚能在野外维持合作。

Strong reciprocity is real, but there is no evidence that uncoordinated costly punishment sustains cooperation in the wild.

机构信息

Department of Economics, University of Milan, 20122 Milan, Italy.

出版信息

Behav Brain Sci. 2012 Feb;35(1):45-59. doi: 10.1017/s0140525x1100166x.

DOI:10.1017/s0140525x1100166x
PMID:22393582
Abstract

I argue in my target article that field evidence does not support the costly punishment hypothesis. Some commentators object to my reading of the evidence, while others agree that evidence in favour of costly punishment is scant. Most importantly, no rigorous measurement of cost-benefit ratios in the field has been attempted so far. This lack of evidence does not rule out costly punishment as a cause of human cooperation, but it does pre-empt some overconfident claims made in the past. Other commentators have interpreted my article as an anti-experimental pamphlet or as a flat denial of the existence of pro-social motives--which it was not intended to be. While we have enough data to establish the existence (and theoretical relevance) of strong reciprocity motives, I argue in this response that their efficacy (and policy relevance) has not been demonstrated.

摘要

我在目标文章中主张,实地证据并不支持代价高昂的惩罚假说。一些评论者反对我对证据的解读,而另一些评论者则同意支持代价高昂的惩罚的证据很少。最重要的是,迄今为止,还没有人尝试对实地的成本效益比进行严格的衡量。这种缺乏证据并不能排除代价高昂的惩罚是人类合作的原因,但它确实预先阻止了过去一些过于自信的主张。其他评论者将我的文章解读为反实验小册子,或断然否认亲社会动机的存在——这并不是我的本意。虽然我们有足够的数据来确定强烈互惠动机的存在(和理论相关性),但我在这篇回应文章中主张,它们的功效(和政策相关性)尚未得到证明。

相似文献

1
Strong reciprocity is real, but there is no evidence that uncoordinated costly punishment sustains cooperation in the wild.强互惠是真实存在的,但没有证据表明不协调的高代价惩罚能在野外维持合作。
Behav Brain Sci. 2012 Feb;35(1):45-59. doi: 10.1017/s0140525x1100166x.
2
Reciprocity: weak or strong? What punishment experiments do (and do not) demonstrate.互惠性:强还是弱?惩罚实验(能和不能)证明什么。
Behav Brain Sci. 2012 Feb;35(1):1-15. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X11000069.
3
The social structure of cooperation and punishment.合作与惩罚的社会结构。
Behav Brain Sci. 2012 Feb;35(1):28-9. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X11000914.
4
The strategic logic of costly punishment necessitates natural field experiments, and at least one such experiment exists.昂贵惩罚的策略逻辑需要自然现场实验,至少存在一个这样的实验。
Behav Brain Sci. 2012 Feb;35(1):31-2. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X11000926.
5
Weak reciprocity alone cannot explain peer punishment.单纯的弱互惠关系并不能解释同伴惩罚现象。
Behav Brain Sci. 2012 Feb;35(1):21-2. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X11001191.
6
Is strong reciprocity really strong in the lab, let alone in the real world?在实验室里,强互惠真的很强,更不用说在现实世界中了?
Behav Brain Sci. 2012 Feb;35(1):29. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X11001257.
7
The punishment that sustains cooperation is often coordinated and costly.维持合作的惩罚通常是协调和有代价的。
Behav Brain Sci. 2012 Feb;35(1):20-1. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X1100118X.
8
Lab support for strong reciprocity is weak: punishing for reputation rather than cooperation.实验室对强互惠的支持很薄弱:为了声誉而惩罚,而不是为了合作。
Behav Brain Sci. 2012 Feb;35(1):39. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X11000884.
9
Reciprocity and uncertainty.互惠与不确定性。
Behav Brain Sci. 2012 Feb;35(1):18-9. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X11001178.
10
In the lab and the field: punishment is rare in equilibrium.在实验室和实地研究中:在均衡状态下,惩罚是罕见的。
Behav Brain Sci. 2012 Feb;35(1):26-8. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X11001415.