Department of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, 113 83 Stockholm, Sweden.
Behav Brain Sci. 2012 Feb;35(1):24. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X11001221.
Guala argues that there is a mismatch between most laboratory experiments on costly punishment and behavior in the field. In the lab, experimental designs typically suppress retaliation. The same is true for most theoretical models of the co-evolution of costly punishment and cooperation, which a priori exclude the possibility of defectors punishing cooperators.
瓜拉认为，大多数关于昂贵惩罚的实验室实验与实地行为之间存在不匹配。在实验室中，实验设计通常会抑制报复行为。同样，昂贵惩罚和合作的共同进化的大多数理论模型也是如此，这些模型从先验上排除了背叛者惩罚合作者的可能性。
