在实验室和实地研究中：在均衡状态下，惩罚是罕见的。
In the lab and the field: punishment is rare in equilibrium.
机构信息
School of Economics, University of Nottingham, University Park, Nottingham NG7 2RD, United Kingdom.
出版信息
Behav Brain Sci. 2012 Feb;35(1):26-8. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X11001415.
PMID:22289316
Abstract
I argue that field (experimental) studies on (costly) peer punishment in social dilemmas face the problem that in equilibrium punishment will be rare and therefore may be hard to observe in the field. I also argue that the behavioral logic uncovered by lab experiments is not fundamentally different from the behavioral logic of cooperation in the field.
摘要
我认为，在社会困境中进行（代价高昂的）同伴惩罚的现场（实验）研究面临着这样一个问题，即在均衡状态下，惩罚将是罕见的，因此在现场可能很难观察到。我还认为，实验室实验揭示的行为逻辑与现场合作的行为逻辑并没有本质上的不同。
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