Sulmasy Daniel P
Kilbride-Clinton Professor of Medicine and Ethics, Department of Medicine and Divinity School, MacLean Center for Clinical Medical Ethics, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA,
Med Health Care Philos. 2013 Nov;16(4):937-44. doi: 10.1007/s11019-012-9400-1.
The word 'dignity' is used in a variety of ways in bioethics, and this ambiguity has led some to argue that the term must be expunged from the bioethical lexicon. Such a judgment is far too hasty, however. In this article, the various uses of the word are classified into three serviceable categories: intrinsic, attributed, and inflorescent dignity. It is then demonstrated that, logically and linguistically, the attributed and inflorescent meanings of the word presuppose the intrinsic meaning. Thus, one cannot conclude that these meanings are arbitrary and unrelated. This categorization and logical and linguistic analysis helps to unravel what seem to be contradictions in discourse about dignity and bioethics, and provides a hierarchy of meaning that has potential normative implications.
“尊严”一词在生物伦理学中有多种用法,这种语义模糊性致使一些人主张该术语必须从生物伦理学词汇表中剔除。然而,这样的判断过于草率。在本文中,该词的各种用法被归为三个实用类别:内在尊严、赋予尊严和衍生尊严。随后论证了,从逻辑和语言角度来看,该词的赋予义与衍生义都预设了内在义。因此,不能得出这些含义是任意且无关联的结论。这种分类以及逻辑和语言分析有助于厘清在关于尊严和生物伦理学的论述中看似存在的矛盾,并提供一个具有潜在规范意义的意义层次结构。