May Joshua, Sinnott-Armstrong Walter, Hull Jay G, Zimmerman Aaron
Rev Philos Psychol. 2010 Jun;1(2):265-273. doi: 10.1007/s13164-009-0014-3. Epub 2010 Jan 12.
In defending his interest-relative account of knowledge, Jason Stanley relies heavily on intuitions about several bank cases. We experimentally test the empirical claims that Stanley seems to make concerning our common-sense intuitions about these cases. Additionally, we test the empirical claims that Jonathan Schaffer seems to make, regarding the salience of an alternative, in his critique of Stanley. Our data indicate that neither raising the possibility of error nor raising stakes moves most people from attributing knowledge to denying it. However, the raising of stakes (but not alternatives) does affect the level of confidence people have in their attributions of knowledge. We argue that our data impugn what both Stanley and Schaffer claim our common-sense judgments about such cases are.
在为其知识的利益相关解释辩护时，贾森·斯坦利严重依赖于关于几个银行案例的直觉。我们通过实验检验了斯坦利似乎就我们对这些案例的常识直觉所提出的实证主张。此外，我们还检验了乔纳森·谢弗在对斯坦利的批评中似乎就一种可能性的显著性所提出的实证主张。我们的数据表明，无论是提出错误的可能性还是提高 stakes，都不会使大多数人从归因于知识转变为否认知识。然而，提高 stakes（而非可能性）确实会影响人们对其知识归因的信心水平。我们认为，我们的数据对斯坦利和谢弗所声称的我们对此类案例的常识判断提出了质疑。 （注：“stakes”在这里不太明确其准确含义，可能需要结合上下文进一步理解，暂直译为“stakes” ）
