New Zealand Centre for Conservation Medicine, Auckland Zoological Park, Western Springs, Auckland, New Zealand.
Zoonoses Public Health. 2012 Dec;59(8):561-7. doi: 10.1111/j.1863-2378.2012.01496.x. Epub 2012 May 29.
Investigation was undertaken to assess the occurrence of zoonotic infection among staff at Auckland Zoological Park, New Zealand, in 1991, 2002 and 2010. Serial cross-sectional health surveys in 1991, 2002 and 2010 comprising a health questionnaire, and serological, immunological and microbiological analysis for a range of potential zoonotic infections were performed. Laboratory results for zoo animals were also reviewed for 2004-2010 to assess the occurrence of potential zoonotic infections. Veterinary clinic, animal handler, grounds, maintenance and administrative staff participated in the surveys, with 49, 42 and 46 participants in the 1991, 2002 and 2010 surveys, respectively (29% of total zoo staff in 2010). A small number of staff reported work-related infections, including erysipelas (1), giardiasis (1) and campylobacteriosis (1). The seroprevalence of antibodies to hepatitis A virus and Toxoplasma gondii closely reflected those in the Auckland community. No carriage of hepatitis B virus (HBV) was detected, and most of those with anti-HBV antibodies had been vaccinated. Few staff had serological evidence of past leptospiral infection. Three veterinary clinic staff had raised Chlamydophila psittaci antibodies, all < 1 : 160 indicating past exposure. Two staff (in 1991) had asymptomatic carriage of Giardia lamblia and one person (in 2010) had a dermatophyte infection. After 1991, positive tests indicating exposure to Mycobacterium tuberculosis were < 10%, comparable to the general New Zealand population. Zoo animals had infections with potential zoonotic agents, including G. lamblia, Salmonella spp., Campylobacter spp. and T. gondii, although the occurrence was low. Zoonotic agents pose an occupational risk to zoo workers. While there was evidence of some zoonotic transmission at Auckland Zoo, this was uncommon and risks appear to be adequately managed under current policies and procedures. Nevertheless, ongoing assessment of risk factors is needed as environmental, human and animal disease and management factors change. Policies and procedures should be reviewed periodically in conjunction with disease monitoring results for both animals and staff to minimise zoonotic transmission.
1991 年、2002 年和 2010 年，对新西兰奥克兰动物园工作人员中的人畜共患病感染情况进行了调查。1991 年、2002 年和 2010 年进行了连续的横断面健康调查，包括健康问卷调查以及针对一系列潜在人畜共患病感染的血清学、免疫学和微生物学分析。还回顾了 2004-2010 年动物园动物的实验室结果，以评估潜在人畜共患病感染的发生情况。兽医诊所、动物饲养员、场地、维护和行政人员参加了调查，1991 年、2002 年和 2010 年的参与者分别为 49、42 和 46 人（2010 年动物园工作人员总数的 29%）。少数工作人员报告了与工作相关的感染，包括丹毒（1 例）、贾第虫病（1 例）和弯曲菌病（1 例）。甲型肝炎病毒和刚地弓形虫抗体的血清阳性率与奥克兰社区的血清阳性率密切相关。未检测到乙型肝炎病毒（HBV）的携带，大多数具有抗 HBV 抗体的人都接种了疫苗。很少有工作人员有过去钩端螺旋体感染的血清学证据。3 名兽医诊所工作人员的鹦鹉热衣原体抗体升高，均<1:160，表明过去曾接触过该病原体。2 名工作人员（1991 年）无症状携带贾第鞭毛虫，1 人（2010 年）患有皮肤癣菌感染。1991 年后，表明接触结核分枝杆菌的阳性检测结果<10%，与新西兰一般人群相当。动物园动物感染了具有潜在人畜共患性的病原体，包括贾第鞭毛虫、沙门氏菌、弯曲菌和刚地弓形虫，尽管感染率较低。人畜共患病原体对动物园工作人员构成职业风险。尽管奥克兰动物园有一些人畜共患传播的证据，但这种情况并不常见，而且在当前政策和程序下，风险似乎得到了很好的管理。然而，随着环境、人类和动物疾病以及管理因素的变化，需要对风险因素进行持续评估。应定期审查政策和程序，同时结合动物和工作人员的疾病监测结果，以最大程度地减少人畜共患传播。
