Department of Genetics, Evolution and Environment, University College London, Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT, UK.
Proc Biol Sci. 2012 Sep 7;279(1742):3556-64. doi: 10.1098/rspb.2012.0758. Epub 2012 Jun 6.
People often consider how their behaviour will be viewed by others, and may cooperate to avoid gaining a bad reputation. Sensitivity to reputation may be elicited by subtle social cues of being watched: previous studies have shown that people behave more cooperatively when they see images of eyes rather than control images. Here, we tested whether eye images enhance cooperation in a dictator game, using the online labour market Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT). In contrast to our predictions and the results of most previous studies, dictators gave away more money when they saw images of flowers rather than eye images. Donations in response to eye images were not significantly different to donations under control treatments. Dictator donations varied significantly across cultures but there was no systematic variation in responses to different image types across cultures. Unlike most previous studies, players interacting via AMT may feel truly anonymous when making decisions and, as such, may not respond to subtle social cues of being watched. Nevertheless, dictators gave away similar amounts as in previous studies, so anonymity did not erase helpfulness. We suggest that eye images might only promote cooperative behaviour in relatively public settings and that people may ignore these cues when they know their behaviour is truly anonymous.
人们经常会考虑自己的行为会被他人如何看待,并可能会为了避免获得坏名声而合作。对声誉的敏感性可能会被被监视的微妙社会线索所激发:之前的研究表明,当人们看到眼睛的图像而不是控制图像时,他们会表现出更多的合作。在这里,我们使用在线劳动力市场亚马逊土耳其机器人(AMT)测试了眼睛图像是否会在独裁者游戏中增强合作。与我们的预测和大多数先前研究的结果相反,当独裁者看到花朵而不是眼睛的图像时,他们会捐出更多的钱。对眼睛图像的捐赠与对照处理下的捐赠没有显著差异。独裁者的捐赠在不同文化中差异显著,但不同图像类型对文化的反应没有系统的差异。与大多数先前的研究不同,通过 AMT 互动的玩家在做出决策时可能会感到真正的匿名,因此他们可能不会对被监视的微妙社会线索做出反应。尽管如此,独裁者的捐赠金额与之前的研究相似,因此匿名并没有消除帮助行为。我们认为,眼睛图像可能只会在相对公开的环境中促进合作行为,而当人们知道自己的行为是真正匿名时,他们可能会忽略这些线索。