Department of Economics, University of La Rioja Cigüeña, 60, 26004-Logroño (Spain.
Health Econ Rev. 2011 Jul 20;1(1):4. doi: 10.1186/2191-1991-1-4.
In this paper, we carry out a theoretical analysis of the strategic choice made by firms regarding the type of food they market when they face consumers who care about the healthy/unhealthy attributes of the product but incur in emotional/health costs when the food they consume has unhealthy attributes. We consider a two-stage game. In the first stage, one of the firms chooses the unhealthy content of its product. In the second stage, both firms simultaneously decide their prices. We find that, depending on the parameters of the model, product differentiation can be maximal or less than maximal. The firm that produces the unhealthy food charges a higher price and obtains a larger share of the market unless the emotional/health costs and the unhealthy food production costs are relatively high. We also find that educational campaigns will not always reduce the demand for the unhealthy food or the degree of the unhealthy attribute.JEL Classification:I10, I18, L11.
在本文中，我们针对企业在面对关心产品健康/不健康属性但在消费不健康属性食品时会产生情绪/健康成本的消费者时所面临的营销策略进行了理论分析。我们考虑了一个两阶段博弈。在第一阶段，其中一家公司选择其产品的不健康含量。在第二阶段，两家公司同时决定价格。我们发现，根据模型的参数，产品差异化可以是最大的或小于最大的。除非情绪/健康成本和不健康食品生产成本相对较高，否则生产不健康食品的公司将收取更高的价格并获得更大的市场份额。我们还发现，教育活动并不总是会降低对不健康食品的需求或不健康属性的程度。JEL 分类：I10、I18、L11。
