Lovering Rob
Bioethics. 2014 Sep;28(7):378-86. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2012.02006.x. Epub 2012 Sep 20.
In my initial critique of the substance view, I raised reductio-style objections to the substance view's conclusion that the standard human fetus has the same intrinsic value and moral standing as the standard adult human being, among others. In this follow-up critique, I raise objections to some of the premises invoked in support of this conclusion. I begin by briefly presenting the substance view as well as its defense. (For a more thorough presentation, see the first part of my critique.) I then raise objections to three claims involved in the substance view's defense: the claim that the standard human fetus's intrinsic value and moral standing is a function of its potentiality; the claim that the standard human fetus's intrinsic value and moral standing is a function of its essential properties; and the claim that it is the possession of the basic potential for rational moral agency that best accounts for the wrongness of killing the standard human fetus, among others.
在我对实体观的初步批判中，我对实体观的结论提出了归谬法式的反对意见，其中包括标准人类胎儿与标准成年人类具有相同的内在价值和道德地位这一结论。在这一后续批判中，我对一些用以支持该结论的前提提出反对意见。我首先简要阐述实体观及其辩护。（更全面的阐述见我的批判的第一部分。）然后，我对实体观辩护中涉及的三个主张提出反对意见：主张标准人类胎儿的内在价值和道德地位是其潜能的函数；主张标准人类胎儿的内在价值和道德地位是其本质属性的函数；以及主张拥有理性道德行为的基本潜能最能解释杀害标准人类胎儿的错误性等主张。
