Lovering Rob
Bioethics. 2017 May;31(4):305-312. doi: 10.1111/bioe.12330. Epub 2016 Dec 23.
In my articles 'The Substance View: A Critique' and 'The Substance View: A Critique (Part 2),' I raise objections to the substance view (naturally), a theory of intrinsic value and moral standing defended by a number of contemporary moral philosophers, including Robert P. George, Patrick Lee, Christopher Tollefsen, and Francis Beckwith. In part one of my critique of the substance view, I raise reductio-style objections to the substance view's conclusion that the standard human fetus has the same intrinsic value and moral standing as the standard adult human being, among other human beings. In part two, I raise objections to some of the premises invoked in support of that conclusion. Here, in part three, I raise objections to Henrik Friberg-Fernros's attempt to rebut some of the aforementioned objections.
在我的文章《实体观批判》和《实体观批判（第二部分）》中，我（自然而然地）对实体观提出了异议。实体观是一种关于内在价值和道德地位的理论，为包括罗伯特·P·乔治、帕特里克·李、克里斯托弗·托勒夫森和弗朗西斯·贝克威斯在内的一些当代道德哲学家所捍卫。在我对实体观批判的第一部分中，我对实体观的结论提出了归谬式的异议，该结论认为标准的人类胎儿与标准的成年人类以及其他人类具有相同的内在价值和道德地位。在第二部分中，我对为支持该结论而援引的一些前提提出了异议。在此，在第三部分中，我对亨里克·弗里贝里 - 费恩罗斯反驳上述一些异议的尝试提出了异议。
