Floyd Shawn
Brehme Centennial Center 102-D, Malone University, Canton, OH, 44709, USA,
HEC Forum. 2015 Sep;27(3):229-48. doi: 10.1007/s10730-015-9265-9.
Many believe that moral value is--at least to some extent--dependent on the developmental states necessary for supporting rational activity. My paper rejects this view, but does not aim simply to register objections to it. Rather, my essay aims to answer the following question: if a human being's developmental state and occurrent capacities do not bequeath moral standing, what does? The question is intended to prompt careful consideration of what makes human beings objects of moral value, dignity, or (to employ my preferred term) goodness. Not only do I think we can answer this question, I think we can show that nascent human life possesses goodness of precisely this sort. I appeal to Aquinas's metaethics to establish the conclusion that the goodness of a human being--even if that being is an embryo or fetus--resides at the substratum of her existence. If she possesses goodness, it is because human existence is good.
许多人认为，道德价值至少在一定程度上取决于支持理性活动所需的发展状态。我的论文反对这种观点，但并非仅仅旨在记录对它的反对意见。相反，我的文章旨在回答以下问题：如果一个人的发展状态和当前能力不能赋予其道德地位，那么什么能赋予呢？这个问题旨在促使人们仔细思考是什么使人类成为道德价值、尊严或（使用我更喜欢的术语）善的对象。我不仅认为我们可以回答这个问题，我还认为我们可以表明，人类的新生生命恰恰具有这种善。我诉诸阿奎那的元伦理学来得出这样的结论：一个人的善——即使那个人是胚胎或胎儿——存在于其存在的基础之中。如果她拥有善，那是因为人类的存在是善的。
