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阿西洛马会议和 H5N1“事件”的教训。

The lessons of Asilomar and the H5N1 "affair".

机构信息

Department of Microbiology and Immunology, Stanford, California, USA.

出版信息

mBio. 2012 Oct 9;3(5):e00354-12. doi: 10.1128/mBio.00354-12.

DOI:10.1128/mBio.00354-12
PMID:23047749
原文链接:https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC3484388/
Abstract

In mid-1974, soon after the first recombinant DNA molecules were replicated in Escherichia coli, scientists called for, and observed, a voluntary moratorium on certain experiments. One goal of the moratorium was to hold a conference (Asilomar) to evaluate the risks, if any, of this new technology. The Asilomar conference concluded that recombinant DNA research should proceed but under strict guidelines. The furor surrounding the recent genetic manipulation of the transmissibility of avian influenza virus H5N1 led to a short-term moratorium that has been extended indefinitely. The question is how long should the moratorium remain in place, or should it be permanent? Voltaire observed, "History never repeats itself; man always does." I believe the parallels of Asilomar can be applied to the problem facing biomedical science today. We should move forward to establish standardized guidelines, using common sense and scientific creativity. The onus of responsibility falls on the individual scientist and involves the education of a new generation of scientists into the social and ethical implications of genetic engineering in a new age of genomics and synthetic biology. In addition, scientists who work with infectious agents must deal not only with biosafety but also, alas, with bioterrorism. The H5N1 "affair" is not a question of freedom of inquiry or the dissemination of scientific research; it is a question of the social responsibility of science and scientists to ensure that the public understands why this work is beneficial and worthwhile.

摘要

1974 年年中,第一批重组 DNA 分子在大肠杆菌中复制后不久,科学家们呼吁并观察到某些实验自愿暂停。暂停的一个目标是召开一次会议(阿西洛马会议),以评估这项新技术是否存在风险。阿西洛马会议的结论是,重组 DNA 研究应该继续进行,但要遵循严格的指导方针。最近对禽流感病毒 H5N1 传播能力的基因操作引起了短暂的暂停,并无限期延长。问题是暂停应该持续多久,或者应该是永久性的?伏尔泰观察到,“历史从不重复,人总是这样。”我相信,阿西洛马会议的相似之处可以应用于当今生物医学科学面临的问题。我们应该向前推进,建立标准化的指导方针,运用常识和科学创造力。责任在于个体科学家,涉及到新一代科学家在基因组学和合成生物学的新时代对基因工程的社会和伦理影响的教育。此外,从事传染病病原体工作的科学家不仅必须应对生物安全问题,而且还要应对生物恐怖主义问题。H5N1“事件”不是探究自由或科学研究传播的问题,而是科学和科学家的社会责任问题,要确保公众了解为什么这项工作是有益和值得的。

相似文献

1
The lessons of Asilomar and the H5N1 "affair".阿西洛马会议和 H5N1“事件”的教训。
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引用本文的文献

1
Risks and benefits of gain-of-function experiments with pathogens of pandemic potential, such as influenza virus: a call for a science-based discussion.对具有大流行潜力的病原体(如流感病毒)进行功能获得性实验的风险与益处:呼吁开展基于科学的讨论。
mBio. 2014 Aug 1;5(4):e01730-14. doi: 10.1128/mBio.01730-14.
2
On the need for a national board to assess dual use research of concern.关于设立国家委员会以评估两用关注研究的必要性。
J Virol. 2014 Jun;88(12):6535-7. doi: 10.1128/JVI.00875-14. Epub 2014 Apr 2.
3
The H5N1 moratorium controversy and debate.H5N1暂停令的争议与辩论。
mBio. 2012 Nov 1;3(5):e00379-12. doi: 10.1128/mBio.00379-12.