Danzon Patricia M, Epstein Andrew J
The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA.
Adv Health Econ Health Serv Res. 2012;23:35-71. doi: 10.1108/s0731-2199(2012)0000023005.
This study examines the effect of price regulation and competition on launch timing and pricing of new drugs.
Our data cover launch experience in 15 countries from 1992 to 2003 for drugs in 12 major therapeutic classes. We estimate a two-equation model of launch hazard and launch price of new drugs.
We find that launch timing and prices of new drugs are related to a country's average prices of established products in a class. Thus to the extent that price regulation reduces price levels, such regulation directly contributes to launch delay in the regulating country. Regulation by external referencing, whereby high-price countries reference low-price countries, also has indirect or spillover effects, contributing to launch delay and higher launch prices in low-price referenced countries.
Referencing policies adopted in high-price countries indirectly impose welfare loss on low-price countries. These findings have implications for US proposals to constrain pharmaceutical prices through external referencing and drug importation.
本研究考察价格管制和竞争对新药上市时间及定价的影响。
我们的数据涵盖了1992年至2003年15个国家12个主要治疗类别的药品上市情况。我们估计了一个关于新药上市风险和上市价格的双方程模型。
我们发现新药的上市时间和价格与某一类别中该国已上市产品的平均价格有关。因此,在价格管制降低价格水平的程度上,这种管制直接导致了管制国家新药上市延迟。通过外部参照进行的管制,即高价国家参照低价国家,也有间接或溢出效应,导致被参照的低价国家新药上市延迟且上市价格更高。
高价国家采用的参照政策间接给低价国家带来了福利损失。这些研究结果对美国通过外部参照和药品进口来限制药品价格的提议具有启示意义。