Northwestern University School of Law, Chicago, Illinois, United States of America.
PLoS One. 2012;7(11):e50310. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0050310. Epub 2012 Nov 21.
Most economic theories are based on the premise that individuals maximize their own self-interest and correctly incorporate the structure of their environment into all decisions, thanks to human intelligence. The influence of this paradigm goes far beyond academia-it underlies current macroeconomic and monetary policies, and is also an integral part of existing financial regulations. However, there is mounting empirical and experimental evidence, including the recent financial crisis, suggesting that humans do not always behave rationally, but often make seemingly random and suboptimal decisions.
Here we propose to reconcile these contradictory perspectives by developing a simple binary-choice model that takes evolutionary consequences of decisions into account as well as the role of intelligence, which we define as any ability of an individual to increase its genetic success. If no intelligence is present, our model produces results consistent with prior literature and shows that risks that are independent across individuals in a generation generally lead to risk-neutral behaviors, but that risks that are correlated across a generation can lead to behaviors such as risk aversion, loss aversion, probability matching, and randomization. When intelligence is present the nature of risk also matters, and we show that even when risks are independent, either risk-neutral behavior or probability matching will occur depending upon the cost of intelligence in terms of reproductive success. In the case of correlated risks, we derive an implicit formula that shows how intelligence can emerge via selection, why it may be bounded, and how such bounds typically imply the coexistence of multiple levels and types of intelligence as a reflection of varying environmental conditions.
Rational economic behavior in which individuals maximize their own self interest is only one of many possible types of behavior that arise from natural selection. The key to understanding which types of behavior are more likely to survive is how behavior affects reproductive success in a given population's environment. From this perspective, intelligence is naturally defined as behavior that increases the probability of reproductive success, and bounds on rationality are determined by physiological and environmental constraints.
大多数经济理论都基于这样一个前提,即个人会最大限度地追求自身利益,并通过人类智慧将环境结构正确纳入所有决策中。这一范式的影响远远超出了学术界——它是当前宏观经济和货币政策的基础,也是现有金融监管的一个组成部分。然而,越来越多的经验和实验证据,包括最近的金融危机,表明人类并不总是理性行事,而是经常做出看似随机和次优的决策。
在这里,我们通过提出一个简单的二元选择模型来调和这些矛盾的观点,该模型考虑了决策的进化后果以及智力的作用,我们将智力定义为个体提高其遗传成功的任何能力。如果没有智力,我们的模型产生的结果与先前的文献一致,并表明在一代人中独立于个体的风险通常会导致风险中立行为,但在一代人中相关的风险可能会导致规避风险、损失厌恶、概率匹配和随机化等行为。当存在智力时,风险的性质也很重要,我们表明,即使风险是独立的,也会根据智力在生殖成功方面的成本,出现风险中立行为或概率匹配行为。在相关风险的情况下,我们推导出一个隐含公式,说明了智力如何通过选择出现,为什么它可能是有界的,以及这种边界通常如何暗示多种类型和水平的智力共存,以反映环境条件的变化。
个体最大化自身利益的理性经济行为只是自然选择产生的多种可能行为类型之一。理解哪种行为类型更有可能生存的关键是行为如何影响给定种群环境中的生殖成功。从这个角度来看,智力自然被定义为增加生殖成功概率的行为,而理性的界限则由生理和环境限制决定。