Department of Social Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
J Appl Psychol. 2013 Jan;98(1):63-79. doi: 10.1037/a0030988. Epub 2012 Dec 3.
Intergroup conflicts are ubiquitous-they occur, for instance, between (work)groups, departments, organizations, political parties, or nations. Such conflicts are commonly addressed through negotiations, in which representatives negotiate on behalf of their constituency. Intergroup negotiations are complex, as representatives need to navigate between the interests of their own constituency and the other party. This implies that negotiation success requires careful processing of information about both parties' interests. Here, we examine how representative negotiators' motivation to engage in such thorough information processing is influenced by their position in the group. Whereas prototypical representatives feel secure about their membership, peripheral representatives have a less certain position. We propose that peripheral representatives are therefore more attentive and responsive to information that may be relevant to the negotiation than prototypical representatives, but only when they are accountable to their constituents. Data from 4 experiments showed that peripheral representatives reported higher information-processing motivation (Experiment 1), bought and recalled more information (Experiment 2), exhibited greater sensitivity to emotional expressions of the outgroup representative (Experiment 3), and attained more integrative ("win-win") agreements (Experiment 4) than prototypical representatives, but only when they were accountable. The findings are discussed in relation to theorizing on group dynamics, motivated information processing, emotion, and intergroup conflict, and practical implications are considered.
群体间冲突普遍存在——它们发生在（工作）群体、部门、组织、政党或国家之间。此类冲突通常通过谈判来解决，谈判代表代表其选区进行谈判。群体间谈判很复杂，因为代表们需要在自己选区的利益和对方之间进行权衡。这意味着谈判成功需要仔细处理双方利益的信息。在这里，我们研究了代表谈判者参与这种深入信息处理的动机如何受到其在群体中的地位的影响。典型的代表对自己的成员身份感到安全，而外围代表的地位则不太确定。我们提出，与典型代表相比，外围代表对可能与谈判相关的信息更加关注和敏感，但前提是他们对选民负责。来自 4 项实验的数据表明，外围代表报告了更高的信息处理动机（实验 1），购买和回忆了更多的信息（实验 2），对群体外代表的情绪表达表现出更高的敏感性（实验 3），并达成了更多的综合性（“双赢”）协议（实验 4），而典型代表则没有，只有当他们负责时才会这样。研究结果与群体动态、动机信息处理、情感和群体间冲突的理论有关，并考虑了实际意义。
