Laboratory of Economics and Management of Health Organizations (LEGOS), Paris-Dauphine University, Place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny, 75016, Paris, France.
Pharmacoeconomics. 2013 Apr;31(4):335-43. doi: 10.1007/s40273-013-0039-4.
To reach the French market, a new drug requires a marketing authorization (MA) and price and reimbursement agreements. These hurdles could delay access to new and promising drugs. Since 1992, French law authorizes the use of unlicensed drugs on an exceptional and temporary basis through a compassionate-use programme, known as Temporary Authorization for Use (ATU). This programme was implemented to improve early access to drugs under development or authorized abroad. However, it is suspected to be inflationary, bypassing public bodies in charge of health technology assessment (HTA) and of pricing.
The aim of this study is to observe the market access after the formal licensing of drugs that went through this compassionate-use programme.
We included all ATUs that received an MA between 1 January 2005 and 30 June 2010. We first examined market access delays from these drugs using the standard administrative path. We positioned this result in relation to launch delays observed in France (for all outpatient drugs) and in other major European markets. Second, we assessed the bargaining power of a hospital purchaser after those drugs had obtained an MA by calculating the price growth rate after the approval.
During the study period, 77 ATUs were formally licensed. The study concluded that, from the patient's perspective, licensing and public bodies' review time was shortened by a combined total of 36 months. The projected 11-month review time of public bodies may be longer than delays usually observed for outpatient drugs. Nonetheless, the study revealed significant benefits for French patient access based on comparable processing to launch time with those of other European countries with tight price control policies. In return, a 12 % premium, on average, is paid to pharmaceutical companies while drugs are under this status (sub-analysis on 56 drugs).
In many instances, the ATU programme responds to a public health need by accelerating the availability of new drugs even though this study suggests an impact of the programme on the market access of these drugs for which the standard administrative path is longer than usual. In addition, pharmaceutical companies seem to market compassionate-use drugs with a presumed benefit/risk ratio at a price that guarantees a margin for future negotiation.
为了进入法国市场,一种新药需要获得营销授权(MA)和价格及报销协议。这些障碍可能会延迟新的有前途的药物的获得。自 1992 年以来,法国法律授权通过一项特殊的、临时性的同情用药计划,即临时使用授权(ATU),在未经许可的情况下使用药物。该计划的实施是为了改善对正在开发或在国外获得授权的药物的早期获取。然而,人们怀疑该计划具有通货膨胀性,绕过了负责卫生技术评估(HTA)和定价的公共机构。
本研究的目的是观察通过这种同情用药计划获得正式许可的药物的市场准入情况。
我们纳入了所有在 2005 年 1 月 1 日至 2010 年 6 月 30 日期间获得 MA 的 ATU。我们首先使用标准行政途径检查这些药物的市场准入延迟。我们将这一结果与法国(所有门诊药物)和其他主要欧洲市场的推出延迟进行了对比。其次,我们通过计算批准后的价格增长率,评估了医院采购方在获得 MA 后的讨价还价能力。
在研究期间,有 77 项 ATU 获得了正式许可。研究结果表明,从患者的角度来看,许可和公共机构的审查时间总共缩短了 36 个月。公共机构预计的 11 个月的审查时间可能比门诊药物通常观察到的延迟时间更长。尽管如此,根据与其他具有严格价格控制政策的欧洲国家类似的启动时间处理方式,该研究表明法国患者的获得药物的机会显著增加。作为回报,在这种状态下(对 56 种药物的子分析),制药公司平均获得 12%的溢价。
在许多情况下,ATU 计划通过加速新药的可获得性来满足公共卫生需求,尽管本研究表明该计划对这些药物的市场准入产生了影响,因为这些药物的标准行政途径比通常情况下更长。此外,制药公司似乎以一种假定的风险/效益比销售同情用药,并以保证未来谈判空间的价格销售。