Biology Department, The Faculty of Science, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic.
PLoS One. 2013 Apr 8;8(4):e60966. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0060966. Print 2013.
The aim of this study was to determine whether people respond differently to low and high stakes in Dictator and Ultimatum Games. We assumed that if we raised the stakes high enough, we would observe more self-orientated behavior because fairness would become too costly, in spite of a possible risk of a higher punishment.
A questionnaire was completed by a sample of 524 university students of biology. A mixed linear model was used to test the relation between the amount at stake (CZK 20, 200, 2,000, 20,000 and 200,000, i.e., approximately $1-$10,000) and the shares, as well as the subjects' gender and the design of the study (single vs. multiple games for different amounts).
We have discovered a significant relationship between the amount at stake and the minimum acceptable offer in the Ultimatum Game and the proposed shares in both Ultimatum and Dictator Games (p = 0.001, p<0.001, p = 0.0034). The difference between playing a single game or more games with several amounts at stake did not influence the relation between the stakes and the offered and minimum acceptable shares. Women proved significantly more generous than men in their offers in the Dictator Game (p = 0.007).
Our results suggest that people's behavior in the Dictator and Ultimatum Games depends on the amount at stake. The players tended to lower their relative proposed shares, as well as their relative minimum acceptable offers. We propose that the Responders' sense of equity and fair play depends on the stakes because of the costs of maintaining fairness. However, our results also suggest that the price of fairness is very high and that it is very difficult, probably even impossible, to buy the transition of Homo sociologicus into Homo economicus.
本研究旨在确定人们在独裁者和最后通牒游戏中对低风险和高风险的反应是否不同。我们假设,如果我们将赌注提高到足够高的水平,我们将观察到更多以自我为中心的行为,因为公平将变得过于昂贵,尽管可能面临更高的惩罚风险。
一项调查问卷由 524 名生物学专业的大学生完成。使用混合线性模型来检验赌注金额(捷克克朗 20、200、2000、20000 和 200000,即约 1 美元至 10000 美元)与份额之间的关系,以及被试的性别和研究设计(单次或多次游戏,赌注金额不同)。
我们发现,在最后通牒游戏中,赌注金额与最低可接受报价之间存在显著关系,在最后通牒和独裁者游戏中,提议的份额也存在显著关系(p=0.001,p<0.001,p=0.0034)。单次游戏或多次游戏的游戏设计对赌注和提议的份额之间的关系没有影响。女性在独裁者游戏中的提议明显比男性更慷慨(p=0.007)。
我们的研究结果表明,人们在独裁者和最后通牒游戏中的行为取决于赌注金额。参与者倾向于降低相对提议的份额,以及相对最低可接受的报价。我们提出,响应者的公平感和公平竞争意识取决于赌注,因为公平的成本很高。然而,我们的研究结果还表明,公平的代价非常高,而且很难甚至不可能通过购买公平来使社会学家变成经济人。