Florey Institute of Neuroscience and Mental Health, University of Melbourne, Parkville, Victoria 3010, Australia.
J Med Ethics. 2013 May;39(5):326-9. doi: 10.1136/medethics-2012-100734.
This paper is a response to Giubilini and Minerva's defence of infanticide. I argue that any account of moral worth or moral rights that depends on the intrinsic properties of individuals alone is committed to agreeing with Giubilini and Minerva that birth cannot by itself make a moral difference to the moral worth of the infant. However, I argue that moral worth need not depend on intrinsic properties alone. It might also depend on relational and social properties. I claim that the in principle availability of neonates to participate in scaffolded interactions with carers might plausibly be seen as contributing to their moral worth.
这篇论文是对朱维利尼和米内瓦为杀婴辩护的回应。我认为，任何依赖个体内在属性来解释道德价值或道德权利的观点，都必然认同朱维利尼和米内瓦的观点，即出生本身并不能使婴儿的道德价值产生质的差异。然而，我认为道德价值不一定仅仅取决于内在属性。它也可能取决于关系和社会属性。我声称，新生儿原则上可以参与与照顾者的有结构互动，这可能被视为对他们的道德价值有贡献。
