Department of Philosophy, Baylor University, One Bear Place #97273, Waco, TX 76798-7273, USA.
J Med Ethics. 2013 May;39(5):341-4. doi: 10.1136/medethics-2012-100844.
This article responds to Giubilini and Minerva's article 'After birth abortion: why should the baby live?' published in the Journal of Medical Ethics. They argue for the permissibility of 'after-birth abortion', based on two conjoined considerations: (1) the fetus or newborn, though a 'potential person', is not an actual person, because it is not mature enough to appreciate its own interests, and (2) because we allow parents to terminate the life of a fetus when it is diagnosed with a deformity or fatal illness because of the burden it will place on the child, parent, family or society we should also allow parents to do the same to their newborn, since it is no more a person than the fetus. The author critiques this case by pointing out (a) the metaphysical ambiguity of potential personhood and (b) why the appeal to burdens is irrelevant or unnecessary.
本文回应了 Giubilini 和 Minerva 在《医学伦理学杂志》上发表的文章“出生后堕胎：为什么婴儿要活着？”。他们基于两个考虑因素为“出生后堕胎”的可允许性辩护：（1）胎儿或新生儿虽然是“潜在的人”，但不是实际的人，因为它还不够成熟，无法理解自己的利益；（2）因为我们允许父母在胎儿被诊断患有畸形或绝症时终止其生命，因为这会给孩子、父母、家庭或社会带来负担，所以我们也应该允许父母对他们的新生儿这样做，因为它与胎儿一样，都不是人。作者通过指出（a）潜在人性的形而上学模糊性和（b）为什么诉诸负担是不相关或不必要的，对这种情况进行了批评。
