Santa Fe Institute, Santa Fe, NM 87501, USA.
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2013 May 28;110(22):8830-5. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1212149110. Epub 2013 May 13.
The advent of farming around 12 millennia ago was a cultural as well as technological revolution, requiring a new system of property rights. Among mobile hunter-gatherers during the late Pleistocene, food was almost certainly widely shared as it was acquired. If a harvested crop or the meat of a domesticated animal were to have been distributed to other group members, a late Pleistocene would-be farmer would have had little incentive to engage in the required investments in clearing, cultivation, animal tending, and storage. However, the new property rights that farming required--secure individual claims to the products of one's labor--were infeasible because most of the mobile and dispersed resources of a forager economy could not cost-effectively be delimited and defended. The resulting chicken-and-egg puzzle might be resolved if farming had been much more productive than foraging, but initially it was not. Our model and simulations explain how, despite being an unlikely event, farming and a new system of farming-friendly property rights nonetheless jointly emerged when they did. This Holocene revolution was not sparked by a superior technology. It occurred because possession of the wealth of farmers--crops, dwellings, and animals--could be unambiguously demarcated and defended. This facilitated the spread of new property rights that were advantageous to the groups adopting them. Our results thus challenge unicausal models of historical dynamics driven by advances in technology, population pressure, or other exogenous changes. Our approach may be applied to other technological and institutional revolutions such as the 18th- and 19th-century industrial revolution and the information revolution today.
大约 12000 年前,农业的出现是一场文化和技术革命,需要建立新的产权制度。在更新世晚期的流动狩猎采集者中,食物在获取后几乎肯定会被广泛分享。如果收获的庄稼或驯养动物的肉要分发给其他群体成员,更新世晚期的潜在农民就没有动力进行必要的投资来进行清理、种植、饲养和储存。然而,农业所需的新产权——确保对自己劳动成果的合法所有权——是不可行的,因为狩猎采集经济中大多数流动和分散的资源都无法以具有成本效益的方式进行划定和保护。如果农业比狩猎采集更具生产力,这个“先有鸡还是先有蛋”的难题就可以得到解决,但最初并非如此。我们的模型和模拟解释了为什么尽管这种情况不太可能发生,但农业和新的有利于农业的产权制度仍然在当时出现了。这种全新世革命不是由先进的技术引发的。它之所以发生,是因为农民的财富——农作物、住所和动物——可以明确划定并加以保护。这促进了新产权的传播,而这些新产权对采用它们的群体是有利的。因此,我们的研究结果挑战了由技术进步、人口压力或其他外部变化推动的历史动态的单一因果模型。我们的方法可以应用于其他技术和制度革命,如 18 世纪和 19 世纪的工业革命以及当今的信息革命。