CNRU, CFIN/MindLab, Aarhus University, Denmark.
Conscious Cogn. 2013 Sep;22(3):810-5. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2013.05.003. Epub 2013 Jun 1.
Experimental studies investigating the contribution of conscious intention to the generation of a sense of agency for one's own actions tend to rely upon a narrow definition of intention. Often it is operationalized as the conscious sensation of wanting to move right before movement. Existing results and discussion are therefore missing crucial aspects of intentions, namely intention as the conscious sensation of wanting to move in advance of the movement. In the present experiment we used an intentional binding paradigm, in which we distinguished between immediate (proximal) intention, as usually investigated, and longer standing (distal) intention. The results showed that the binding effect was significantly enhanced for distal intentions compared to proximal intentions, indicating that the former leads to stronger sense of agency. Our finding provides empirical support for a crucial distinction between at least two types of intention when addressing the efficacy of conscious intentions.
实验研究倾向于依赖于对意图的狭义定义来调查有意识的意图对自己行为的产生代理权感的贡献。通常,它被操作化为在运动之前有意识地感觉到想要移动。因此,现有结果和讨论缺少意图的关键方面,即意图作为在运动之前有意识地感觉到想要移动的感觉。在本实验中,我们使用了意图绑定范式,在该范式中,我们区分了通常研究的即时(近端)意图和更持久的(远端)意图。结果表明,与近端意图相比,远端意图的绑定效应明显增强,这表明前者导致更强的代理权感。我们的发现为在探讨有意识的意图的效力时,对意图至少有两种类型进行区分提供了经验支持。