Department of Ecology & Evolution, University of Lausanne, CH-1015, Lausanne, Switzerland.
Ecol Lett. 2013 Nov;16(11):1356-64. doi: 10.1111/ele.12178. Epub 2013 Sep 10.
Human cooperation is typically coordinated by institutions, which determine the outcome structure of the social interactions individuals engage in. Explaining the Neolithic transition from small- to large-scale societies involves understanding how these institutions co-evolve with demography. We study this using a demographically explicit model of institution formation in a patch-structured population. Each patch supports both social and asocial niches. Social individuals create an institution, at a cost to themselves, by negotiating how much of the costly public good provided by cooperators is invested into sanctioning defectors. The remainder of their public good is invested in technology that increases carrying capacity, such as irrigation systems. We show that social individuals can invade a population of asocials, and form institutions that support high levels of cooperation. We then demonstrate conditions where the co-evolution of cooperation, institutions, and demographic carrying capacity creates a transition from small- to large-scale social groups.
人类合作通常由制度协调，这些制度决定了个人参与的社会互动的结果结构。要解释从小规模社会到大规模社会的新石器时代转型，就需要了解这些制度如何与人口统计学共同进化。我们使用一个在斑块结构的种群中形成机构的人口统计学明确模型来研究这个问题。每个斑块都支持社会和非社会小生境。社会个体通过协商合作提供的昂贵公共品中有多少投资用于制裁违约者，以自身为代价创建一个机构。他们的剩余公共品投资于增加承载能力的技术，例如灌溉系统。我们表明，社会个体可以入侵一个非社会个体的种群，并形成支持高水平合作的制度。然后，我们展示了合作、制度和人口承载能力的共同进化在何种条件下创造了从小规模到大规模社会群体的转变。
