Gürerk Ozgür, Irlenbusch Bernd, Rockenbach Bettina
University of Erfurt, Nordhäuser Strasse 63, 99089 Erfurt, Germany.
Science. 2006 Apr 7;312(5770):108-11. doi: 10.1126/science.1123633.
Understanding the fundamental patterns and determinants of human cooperation and the maintenance of social order in human societies is a challenge across disciplines. The existing empirical evidence for the higher levels of cooperation when altruistic punishment is present versus when it is absent systematically ignores the institutional competition inherent in human societies. Whether punishment would be deliberately adopted and would similarly enhance cooperation when directly competing with nonpunishment institutions is highly controversial in light of recent findings on the detrimental effects of punishment. We show experimentally that a sanctioning institution is the undisputed winner in a competition with a sanction-free institution. Despite initial aversion, the entire population migrates successively to the sanctioning institution and strongly cooperates, whereas the sanction-free society becomes fully depopulated. The findings demonstrate the competitive advantage of sanctioning institutions and exemplify the emergence and manifestation of social order driven by institutional selection.
理解人类合作的基本模式和决定因素以及人类社会中社会秩序的维持是一个跨学科的挑战。现有关于存在利他惩罚时与不存在利他惩罚时合作水平更高的实证证据系统性地忽视了人类社会中固有的制度竞争。鉴于近期关于惩罚有害影响的研究结果，当惩罚与非惩罚制度直接竞争时，惩罚是否会被刻意采用以及是否同样会增强合作极具争议性。我们通过实验表明，在与无制裁制度的竞争中，制裁制度是无可争议的赢家。尽管起初存在厌恶情绪，但全体人口陆续迁移至制裁制度并大力合作，而无制裁的社会则完全无人居住。这些发现证明了制裁制度的竞争优势，并例证了由制度选择驱动的社会秩序的出现和表现。
