Department of Mathematics, Center for the Dynamics of Social Complexity, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN, 37996, USA.
Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, National Institute for Mathematical and Biological Synthesis, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN, 37996, USA.
Sci Rep. 2020 Feb 10;10(1):2251. doi: 10.1038/s41598-020-57562-1.
Leadership can be effective in promoting cooperation within a group, but as the saying goes "heavy is the head that wears the crown". A lot of debate still surrounds exactly what motivates individuals to expend the effort necessary to lead their groupmates. Evolutionary game theoretic models represent individual's thought processes by strategy update protocols. The most common of these are random mutation, individual learning, selective imitation, and myopic optimization. Recently we introduced a new strategy update protocol - foresight - which takes into account future payoffs, and how groupmates respond to one's own strategies. Here we apply our approach to a new 2 × 2 game, where one player, a leader, ensures via inspection and punishment that the other player, a subordinate, produces collective good. We compare the levels of inspection and production predicted by Nash Equilibrium, Quantal Response Equilibrium, level-k cognition, fictitious play, reinforcement learning, selective payoff-biased imitation, and foresight. We show that only foresight and selective imitation are effective at promoting contribution by the subordinate and inspection and punishment by the leader. The role of selective imitation in cultural and social evolution is well appreciated. In line with our prior findings, foresight is a viable alternative route to cooperation.
领导力在促进团队合作方面可能是有效的，但正如俗话说的那样，“头上的王冠重若千钧”。到底是什么激励个人付出必要的努力来领导他们的队友，这仍然存在很多争议。进化博弈论模型通过策略更新协议来代表个人的思维过程。其中最常见的协议是随机突变、个体学习、选择性模仿和短视优化。最近，我们引入了一种新的策略更新协议——远见，它考虑了未来的收益，以及队友如何回应自己的策略。在这里，我们将我们的方法应用于一个新的 2×2 博弈中，其中一个玩家（领导者）通过检查和惩罚来确保另一个玩家（下属）生产集体利益。我们比较了纳什均衡、量子反应均衡、层次 k 认知、虚拟博弈、强化学习、有选择性的收益偏见模仿和远见预测的检查和生产水平。我们表明，只有远见和选择性模仿才能有效地促进下属的贡献和领导者的检查和惩罚。选择性模仿在文化和社会进化中的作用是广为人知的。与我们之前的发现一致，远见是合作的另一种可行途径。
