University of Toronto, Department of Philosophy, 170 St. George St., Toronto, ON, Canada M5R 2M8.
Cognition. 2013 Dec;129(3):666-9. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2013.08.016. Epub 2013 Sep 13.
Do laypeople and philosophers differ in their attributions of knowledge? Starmans and Friedman maintain that laypeople differ from philosophers in taking 'authentic evidence' Gettier cases to be cases of knowledge. Their reply helpfully clarifies the distinction between 'authentic evidence' and 'apparent evidence'. Using their sharpened presentation of this distinction, we contend that the argument of our original paper still stands.
外行和哲学家在知识归因上是否存在差异?斯塔曼斯和弗里德曼认为,外行人与哲学家的区别在于,他们将“真实证据”盖梯尔案例视为知识案例。他们的回答有助于澄清“真实证据”和“表面证据”之间的区别。利用他们对这一区别的更清晰表述,我们认为我们原始论文的论点仍然成立。