Department of Social Sciences, University of Eastern Finland, P.O. Box 1627, 70211, Kuopio, Finland,
J Bioeth Inq. 2013 Dec;10(4):457-67. doi: 10.1007/s11673-013-9481-4. Epub 2013 Oct 5.
The suffering of nonhuman animals has become a noted factor in deciding public policy and legislative change. Yet, despite this growing concern, skepticism toward such suffering is still surprisingly common. This paper analyzes the merits of the skeptical approach, both in its moderate and extreme forms. In the first part it is claimed that the type of criterion for verification concerning the mental states of other animals posed by skepticism is overly (and, in the case of extreme skepticism, illogically) demanding. Resting on Wittgenstein and Husserl, it is argued that skepticism relies on a misguided epistemology and, thus, that key questions posed by it face the risk of absurdity. In the second part of the paper it is suggested that, instead of skepticism, empathy together with intersubjectivity be adopted. Edith Stein's take on empathy, along with contemporary findings, are explored, and the claim is made that it is only via these two methods of understanding that the suffering of nonhuman animals can be perceived.
动物的痛苦已成为决定公共政策和立法改革的一个重要因素。然而，尽管人们对此越来越关注，但对这种痛苦的怀疑仍然相当普遍。本文分析了怀疑论方法的优点，包括其温和形式和极端形式。在第一部分中，有人声称，怀疑论对其他动物的心理状态提出的验证标准过于苛刻（在极端怀疑论的情况下，甚至是不合逻辑的）。基于维特根斯坦和胡塞尔的观点，本文认为怀疑论依赖于一种错误的认识论，因此，它所提出的关键问题面临荒谬的风险。在本文的第二部分中，建议采用同理心和主体间性来代替怀疑论。本文探讨了埃迪丝·斯坦因对同理心的看法以及当代的发现，并提出，只有通过这两种理解方法，才能感知到非人类动物的痛苦。
