Miller Jeff, Schwarz Wolf
Department of Psychology, University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand.
University of Potsdam, Department of Psychology, P.O. Box 60 15 53, D-14415 Potsdam-Golm, Germany.
Conscious Cogn. 2014 Feb;24:12-21. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2013.12.004. Epub 2014 Jan 4.
Neuroscientific studies have shown that brain activity correlated with a decision to move can be observed before a person reports being consciously aware of having made that decision (e.g., Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983; Soon, Brass, Heinze, & Haynes, 2008). Given that a later event (i.e., conscious awareness) cannot cause an earlier one (i.e., decision-related brain activity), such results have been interpreted as evidence that decisions are made unconsciously (e.g., Libet, 1985). We argue that this interpretation depends upon an all-or-none view of consciousness, and we offer an alternative interpretation of the early decision-related brain activity based on models in which conscious awareness of the decision to move develops gradually up to the level of a reporting criterion. Under this interpretation, the early brain activity reflects sub-criterion levels of awareness rather than complete absence of awareness and thus does not suggest that decisions are made unconsciously.
神经科学研究表明,在一个人报告自己有意识地意识到做出了某个动作决定之前,就可以观察到与该动作决定相关的大脑活动(例如,利贝特、格里森、赖特和珀尔,1983年;松、布拉斯、海因策和海恩斯,2008年)。鉴于后来的事件(即有意识的觉察)不能导致更早的事件(即与决定相关的大脑活动),这样的结果被解释为决定是无意识做出的证据(例如,利贝特,1985年)。我们认为这种解释依赖于一种关于意识的全或无观点,并且我们基于这样的模型提供了一种对早期与决定相关的大脑活动的替代性解释,在这些模型中,对动作决定的有意识觉察会逐渐发展到报告标准的水平。根据这种解释,早期的大脑活动反映的是低于标准水平的觉察,而不是完全没有觉察,因此并不表明决定是无意识做出的。