Slatman Jenny
Department of Health, Ethics and Society, Maastricht University, PO Box 616, 6200 MD, Maastricht, The Netherlands,
Med Health Care Philos. 2014 Nov;17(4):549-57. doi: 10.1007/s11019-014-9544-2.
In this paper I explore the various meanings of embodiment from a patient's perspective. Resorting to phenomenology of health and medicine, I take the idea of 'lived experience' as starting point. On the basis of an analysis of phenomenology's call for bracketing the natural attitude and its reduction to the transcendental, I will explain, however, that in medical phenomenological literature 'lived experience' is commonly one-sidedly interpreted. In my paper, I clarify in what way the idea of 'lived experience' should be revisited and, subsequently, what this reconsideration means for phenomenological research on embodiment in health and medicine. The insight that the body is a condition of possibility for world-disclosing yet, at the same time, itself conditioned by this world forces us to not only zoom in on the body's subject-side, but also on its object-side. I argue that in order to render account for this double body ontology, phenomenology should include empirical sociological analyses as well. I thus argue in favor of the idea of a socio-phenomenology. Drawing on material from my own research project on embodied self-experiences after breast surgery, I show how this approach can be fruitful in interpreting the impact of disfigurements on a person's embodied agency, or a person's 'I can'.
在本文中,我从患者的角度探讨了具身化的各种含义。借助健康与医学现象学,我将“生活体验”的概念作为出发点。然而,在分析了现象学对悬置自然态度及其还原到先验的要求的基础上,我将解释,在医学现象学文献中,“生活体验”通常被片面地解读。在我的论文中,我阐明了应以何种方式重新审视“生活体验”的概念,以及随后这种重新思考对健康与医学中具身化的现象学研究意味着什么。身体是揭示世界的可能性条件,但同时又受这个世界的制约,这一见解迫使我们不仅要关注身体的主体层面,还要关注其客体层面。我认为,为了解释这种双重身体本体论,现象学也应包括实证社会学分析。因此,我主张社会现象学的观点。借鉴我自己关于乳房切除术后具身自我体验的研究项目中的材料,我展示了这种方法在解释身体缺陷对一个人的具身能动性或一个人的“我能”的影响方面如何富有成效。