Abou Chakra Maria, Hilbe Christian, Traulsen Arne
Evolutionary Theory Group, Max Planck Institute, D-24306 Plön, Germany.
1] Evolutionary Theory Group, Max Planck Institute, D-24306 Plön, Germany [2] Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA.
Sci Rep. 2014 Mar 4;4:4251. doi: 10.1038/srep04251.
Mafia like behavior, where individuals cooperate under the threat of punishment, occurs not only in humans, but is also observed in several animal species. Observations suggest that avian hosts tend to accept a certain degree of parasitism in order to avoid retaliating punishment from the brood parasite. To understand under which conditions it will be beneficial for a host to cooperate, we model the interaction between hosts and parasites as an evolutionary game. In our model, the host's behavior is plastic, and thus, its response depends on the previous interactions with the parasite. We find that such learned behavior in turn is crucial for the evolution of retaliating parasites. The abundance of this kind of mafia behavior oscillates in time and does not settle to an equilibrium. Our results suggest that retaliation is a mechanism for the parasite to evade specialization and to induce acceptance by the host.
类似黑手党的行为,即个体在惩罚威胁下进行合作,不仅发生在人类中,在一些动物物种中也有观察到。观察表明,鸟类宿主倾向于接受一定程度的寄生,以避免遭受巢寄生者的报复性惩罚。为了理解在哪些条件下宿主进行合作是有益的,我们将宿主与寄生者之间的相互作用建模为一个进化博弈。在我们的模型中,宿主的行为是可塑的,因此,其反应取决于与寄生者之前的相互作用。我们发现,这种习得行为反过来对于报复性寄生者的进化至关重要。这种类似黑手党行为的数量会随时间振荡,不会趋于平衡。我们的结果表明,报复是寄生者逃避特化并促使宿主接受的一种机制。