Kahane Guy
Oxford University.
Ethics. 2014 Jan 1;124(2):327-341. doi: 10.1086/673433.
Lazari-Radek and Singer argue that evolutionary considerations can resolve Sidgwick's dualism of practical reason, because such considerations debunk moral views that give weight to self-interested or partial considerations, but cannot threaten the principle Universal Benevolence. I argue that if we grant these claims, this appeal to evolution is ultimately self-defeating. Lazari-Radek and Singer face a dilemma. Either their evolutionary argument against partial morality succeeds, but then we need to also give up our conviction that suffering is bad; or there is a way to defend this conviction, but then their argument against partiality fails. Utilitarians, I suggest, should resist the temptation to appeal to evolutionary debunking arguments.
拉扎里-拉德克和辛格认为，从进化的角度考虑能够解决西季威克实践理性的二元论问题，因为这样的思考能够揭穿那些重视利己或偏袒性考量的道德观点，但不会威胁到普遍仁爱原则。我认为，如果我们认可这些观点，那么诉诸进化最终是自我挫败的。拉扎里-拉德克和辛格面临一个两难困境。要么他们反对偏袒性道德的进化论证成功了，但那样的话我们也需要放弃我们认为痛苦是坏事的信念；要么有一种方法能捍卫这一信念，但那样的话他们反对偏袒性的论证就失败了。我建议，功利主义者应该抵制诉诸进化揭穿论证的诱惑。
